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ICWA DOWNUNDER: EXPLORING THE
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ENACTING AN
AUSTRALIAN VERSION OF THE UNITED
STATES’ INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT
Marcia Zug*
Australian Indigenous Advocates have long sought the
passage of Indigeous child-welfare legislation similar to
the United States’s Indian Child Welfare Act. Recently, the
Australian government has indicated it is receptive to the
enactment of such legislation. However, an Australian
version of the ICWA is not as simple as it sounds. The legal
status of the Indigenous communities of Australia and
American Indian tribes is vastly different thus, many of the
ICWA’s provisions, particularly those based on a
recognition of Indigenous sovereignty, would require
significant modifications before they coud be applied in
Australia. These modifications mean an Australian ICWA
could not be as robust as the American version of the Act.
Nevertheless, with these changes, an Australian version of
the ICWA is feasible and could significantly reduce
Indigenous child removals and the break up of Indigenous
families and communities in Australia.
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INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 2019, I stood outside my flat in Canberra,
Australia and looked up as the words “I’m Sorry, 10” were
slowly written across the sky. The words commemorated
the ten years since Former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd
issued his official apology for the Australian government’s
role in the “Stolen Generation”, the decades-long policy of
removing Indigenous children from their families and
communities.1
Rudd’s apology was of monumental importance.2 It
was the first time the Australian government had ever
*

I would like to thank Professors Lorana Bartels, Patricia Easteal, Terri
Libesman, Nicole Watson, and Jennifer Hill for their support and
encouragement with this project. I would also like to thank the
University of Canberra and the US-Australian Fulbright Commission
for making this research possible.

1

Abbie O’Brien, “‘We Say Sorry’: Today Marks More than a Decade
Since Kenvin Rudd’s National Apology”, SBS News (13 February
2018), online: <www.sbs.com.au/news/we-say-sorry-today-marksmore-than-a-decade-since-kevin-rudd-s-national-apology>. See also
Andrew Gunstone, “Reconciliation, Reparations and Rights:
Indigenous Australians and the Stolen Generations” in Damien Short
& Corinne Lennox, eds, Handbook of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights
(New York: Routledge, 2016) 301.

2

See Danielle Celermajer, The Sins of the Nation and the Rituals of
Apologies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 212.
Celermajer notes that “even people who had expressed cynicism about
the apology or who were not sympathetic to the new government found
themselves profoundly involved and affected.” See also Don Watson,
speaking in Geraldine Doogue, “Reflections on the Apology
Saturday”,
ABC
News
(16
Feb
2008),
online:
<www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/saturdayextra/reflectionson-the-apology/3284448>. Watson stated, “I think it’s a different
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apologized for the terror and devastation it had inflicted on
generations of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
families.3 At the same time, Rudd’s apology had little
practical effect. More than ten years after the apology and
decades after the official end of the child removal policy,
Indigenous families in Australia continue to face
unjustifiably high rates of separation.4 Thus, it seemed
fitting that the word “apology” began disintegrating before
it was even fully written against the sky.5
I was in Australia because I hoped to help
Indigenous families affected by Australia’s child removal
policies. More specifically, I was there to research whether
an American law, a statute known as the Indian Child
Welfare Act or ICWA, might model a potential solution.6

country since [the apology] . . . I think it’s a bit different in most of our
heads, whether we’re for or ag[ainst] it. And I think that Kevin Rudd
has given a sort of moral compass to the matter of our relations with
Aboriginal Australia.”
3

See e.g. Elizabeth Keenan, “Australia Learns to Say ‘I’m Sorry’”, Time
(1 February 2008) (discussing the decision to issue a national apology).

4

See Gunstone, supra note 1 at 309 (explaining that the government had
previously acknowledged the removal of Indigenous children, but that
this was the first time it had specifically apologized for doing so).

5

See e.g. ibid at 309. They note that notwithstanding the apology,
“Indigenous peoples and communities impacted upon by the
legislation, policies and practices that resulted in the stolen
generations, continued to be refused substantial justice by the Federal
government.”

6

In this article, I primarily use the term Indian or American Indian rather
than Native American, First Nations, or Indigenous when discussing
the indigenous people of the United States. I recognize that this term
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The ICWA is an American law passed to address the
legacy of the United States’ [US] own Indigenous familyseparation policies. The law helps ensure Indigenous
family preservation through provisions that prevent the
unnecessary removal of Indian children as well as
provisions that help families regain custody of their
children when they are removed.
For decades, Aboriginal advocates and their
supporters have pushed for the passage of an Australian
ICWA.7 More recently, non-Indigenous groups such as the
can be controversial. However, because it is common in both the
academic literature and in the majority of statutes and case law, I have
chosen to use it in this article. See also Michael Yellow Bird, “What
We Want to Be Called: Indigenous Peoples’ Perspectives on Racial
and Ethnic Identity Labels” (1999) 23:2 American Indian Q 1, citing
Hilary N Weaver, “Introduction” in Marvin D Feit, John S Wodarski
& Hilary N Weaver, eds, Voices of First Nations People: Human
Services Considerations (New York: Haworth Press, 1999) for further
information on this topic. Yellow Bird notes that both the terms
“‘American Indian’ and ‘Native American’ are the most common
racial and ethnic labels used to identify the general population of
Indigenous Peoples in the United States” and that “neither term has
been without controversy, and no clear consensus exists on which label
is most preferable.” In addition, I will primarily use the term
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander when discussing Indigenous
people of Australia. However, I will also use the term Indigenous while
recognising that this term may not adequately capture the rich and
diverse cultures of Aborignal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.
7

See Richard Chisholm, “Aboriginal Child Welfare and the Possibility
of Federal Laws” (1982) 1:6 Aboriginal L Bull 6. Chisholm notes that
he was asked by representatives of Aboriginal Child Care Agencies
“whether it would be possible for the Commonwealth Parliament to
pass legislation similar to the Indian Child Welfare Act 1978 of the
USA.” See also Brian Butler, “Aboriginal Child Protection in The
Practice of Child Protection: Australian Approaches” in Gillian
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Australian Law Reform Commission have also suggested
that the Commonwealth “should establish a national
inquiry into child protection laws and processes affecting
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children.”8 However,
an Australian version of the ICWA is not as simple as it
sounds. The legal status of the Indigenous communities of
Australia and American Indian tribes is vastly different.
Most significantly, the US federal government recognizes
the sovereignty of American Indian nations, albeit in a
limited and precarious way,9 while the Australian
government does not recognize Aboriginal or Torres Strait
Islander sovereignty. Many of the ICWA’s provisions are
based on a recognition of tribal sovereignty, consequently,

Calvert, Adrian Ford & Patrick Parkinson, eds, The Practice of Child
Protection: Australian Approaches (Sydney: Hale and Iremonger,
1992) at 19. They state: “[o]ur organisation also seeks the enactment
of national legislation along the lines of the Indian Child Welfare Act.”
See also Paul Grey, “Protecting Indigenous Children: 3 Lessons
Australia Could Learn from the United States”, Medium (29 October
2017), online: <medium.com/@AbSecNSW/protecting-indigenouschildren-3-lessons-australia-could-learn-from-the-united-states5b4e076c10d9>. They ask the Australian government to pass
legislation similar to ICWA to strengthen protections for Aboriginal
families. See generally Linda Briskman, The Black Grapevine:
Aboriginal Activism and the Stolen Generations (Sydney: Federation
Press, 2003) at 110–19. Briskman discusses the various efforts to
secure national legislation similar to ICWA.
8

Austl, Commonwealth, Law Reform Commission, Pathways to
Justice—An Inquiry into the Incaceration Rate of Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Peoples (Report No 133) (Canberra: Australian
Government Publishing Service, 2017) at 18.

9

See Part II.A of this article for a discussion of the history of and current
limitations on the exercise of tribal sovereignty in the United States.
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the Act cannot simply be imported into Australia. An
Australian ICWA would require significant modifications.
This article examines how the ICWA would have to
change to operate in Australia and whether, so modified, it
could still effectively protect Aboriginal families.
Ultimately, this article concludes that an Australian ICWA
would not be as robust as the American version of the Act,
but that it could still significantly reduce Indigenous child
removals and strengthen Indigenous families and
communities in Australia. Part I will demonstrate why an
Australian ICWA is needed. Part II will describe the history
of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander rights. Part III will
examine the limitations of an ICWA created pursuant to
delegated authority and how an Australian ICWA could
potentially avoid or overcome these drawbacks. Part IV
will evaluate the weaknesses of the Indigenous child
protection in the United States and suggest how an
Australian ICWA could avoid these problems. Part V will
discuss the benefits and potential advantages of an
Australian ICWA as compared with the US version.
Finally, the conclusion will consider how the passage of an
Australian ICWA could affect Indigenous selfdetermination rights more generally.
I. THE NEED FOR AN AUSTRALIAN ICWA
A. A SECOND STOLEN GENERATION?
As mentioned above, Australian Indigenous advocates
have long sought the passage of legislation resembling the
ICWA. However, an examination into the potential benefits
of an Australian ICWA is now particularly timely and
important due to the fact that Australia’s long-standing
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aversion to permitting the adoption of any Australian
children, and Indigenous Australian children in particular,
is quickly disappearing.10 In March 2018, the House of
Representatives Standing Committee on Social Policy and
Legal Affairs began an inquiry into the possibility of
creating a national framework for domestic adoption.11 The
Standing Committee inquiry noted the significant variation
in the legislation and practices that apply to adoptions
throughout Australia.12 Eight months later the Committee
published its report. It recommended implementing a
national adoption framework to provide uniformity to
Australian adoption law and to increase the rate of
Australian children being adopted.13 This recommendation

10

See Austl, Commonwealth, House of Representatives Standing
Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs, Breaking Barriers: A
National Adoption Framework for Australian Children – Inquiry into
Local Adoption (October 2018) at 5–6 [Breaking Barriers]. The report
noted that the most frequently cited barrier to domestic adoption “was
fear of repeating the mistakes of past forced adoption policies and
practices that were in place from the 1950s until the 1980s.” See also
Jeremy Sammut, “Our Reluctance Towards Adoption is Hurting
Children”, ABC News (21 April 2015) (explaining how past removal
policiesd have affected current Australian attitues towards adoption);
Leigh Cambell, “The Current State of Adoption in Australia”,
Huffington Post (9 November 2016) (discussing how Australians’
“negative attitudes towards adoption” effect adoption rates).

11

See Parliament of Australia, Media Release, “Inquiry into Local
Adoption”
(2018),
online:
<www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/House/Social
_Policy_and_Legal_Affairs/Localadoption>.

12

See Breaking Barriers, supra note 10 at 8.

13

See ibid at 32 (Recommendation 2).
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appears to herald a major shift in how domestic adoption is
viewed in Australia.14
The renewed adoption interest in Australia raises
particular concerns for Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander children.15 Currently, these children are subject to
extremely low rates of adoption.16 However, that could
change if a national adoption law is implemented.
Although the Parliamentary Inquiry into Adoption
recognized that Australia’s history of forced Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander child adoptions creates unique
concerns regarding the adoption of these children, it still
included them in the inquiry and ultimately recommended
14

The shift towards easing adoptions restrictions can also be seen in
recently enacted legislation, such as recent laws passed by the New
South Wales Parliament permitting children to be adopted without
parental consent. See Lorena Allam, “Adoption without Parental
Consent Legalised in NSW”, The Guardian (23 November 2018),
online:
<www.theguardian.com/australianews/2018/nov/23/adoption-without-parental-consent-legalised-innsw>. See also Patrick Wood, “Adoptions on the Rise After Droping
to Record Low Last Year”, ABC News (11 December 2017), online:
</www.abc.net.au/news/2017-12-12/adoption-rates-on-rise-afterdropping-to-record-low/9248958> (Adopt Change CEO Renee Carter
noted “an encouraging shift in thinking [about adoption] in Australia”).

15

Critics such as Professor Terri Libesman have noted that this move
towards adoption may also be motivated by financial and political
concerns. In recent years, the number of Australian children in out-ofhome care has grown at alarming rates and the cost of this care was
estimated at 2.2 billion Australian dollars in 2013–14. See Terri
Libesman, “Indigenous Child Welfare Post Bringing Them Home:
From Aspirations for Self-Determination to Neoliberal Assimilation”
(2015) 19:1 Austl Indig L Rev 46 at 54.

16

Since 1993, only 125 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children
have been adopted and half of those children were adopted by
Indigenous families. See Breaking Barriers, supra note 10 at 58.
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including them in the proposed national framework.17 Due
to this inclusion, the need for national Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander child protection legislation is now
more pressing than ever.
It is possible that when national adoption
legislation is ultimately enacted it will contain specific
protections or exceptions for Indigenous children,
however, it would be unwise to rely on such possibilities.
In fact, expecting such protections is especially risky given
the fact that recent adoption reforms enacted at the state
level did not exempt Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
families. For example, in November 2018, the New South
Wales government passed The Children and Young
Persons (Care and Protection) Amendment Bill 2018.18
This Act expands the ability of family and community
services to permanently remove children from their
families and, most worryingly, places a two-year time limit
on finding a permanent placement for such children.19
17

The Committee Report noted that the organizations consulted
regarding the possibility of aboriginal child adoptions all advised
against it. See Breaking Barriers, supra note 10 at 5–6, 29, 56, 65–74,
83–84. Breaking Barriers ignored this advice, stating that although
“family preservation and cultural considerations are important”, they
are “not more important than the safety and wellbeing of the child.”
The Committee then recommended the enactment a national adoption
law for all children. See Breaking Barriers, supra note 10 at xvii.

18

See Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Amendment
Act 2018 (NSW) 2018/81.

19

The most important of the proposed changes are the following: (1)
Placing a two-year time limit on creating a permanent arrangement for
the child (ibid, Schedule 1, s 20, amending s 79); (2) making
guardianship order by consent outside of court (ibid, Schedule 1, s 19,
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These reforms were fiercely opposed by Indigenous
advocates20 who warned they would create a second Stolen
Generation. Unfortunately, their objections were ignored
and the changes were instituted with no exceptions or
additional protections for Indigenous children.21
Consequently, an Australian ICWA is needed not only to
address the continuing effects of the original “stolen
generation,” but to also prevent the creation of a second
one. However, because the legal position of American
Indians and Australian Aboriginal and Torres Strait
amending s 74); (3) amending how families can apply for restoration
(ibid, Schedule 1, throughout); (4) removing parental consent to
adoption for children on permanent orders. See Alison Whittaker &
Terri Libesman, “Why Controversial Child Protection Reforms in
NSW Could Lead to Another Stolen Generation”, The Conversation
(12 November 2018), online: <theconversation.com/whycontroversial-child-protection-reforms-in-nsw-could-lead-to-anotherstolen-generation-106330>.
20

See e.g. Pip Hinman, “NSW Law Will ‘Lead to a New Stolen
Generation’”, Green Left Weekly (3 December 2018), online:
<www.greenleft.org.au/content/nsw-law-will-lead-new-stolengeneration>. Hinman notes that “Indigenous groups, unions, the NSW
Greens and the Labor Party oppose the new law and organized several
protests outside NSW Parliament. Seventy-nine organizations and
more than 2000 individuals signed an open letter to the Premier, urging
her ‘to put these reforms on hold and engage in genuine dialogue with
all stakeholders, including Aboriginal communities and community
organisations supporting children in families.’”

21

See ibid. See also Marlene Longbottom et al, “Indigenous Australian
Children and the Impact of Adoption Legislation in New South Wales”
(2019)
393
Lancet
1499,
online
(pdf):
<www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736(19)302521.pdf>. Longbottom notes that “[f]or Indigenous Australian children,
this new law risks permanently separating another generation from
their families.”
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Islander people is not equivalent, it is necessary to first
understand the history and application of the ICWA in the
United States before considering how the Act could be
imported into Australia.
B. THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE ICWA
In 1978, the United States Congress enacted the ICWA in
response to the shockingly high rates of Indian child
removals that were continuing through the country.22 The
legislative reports noted that these removals were
frequently based on biased views about proper child
rearing and that Indian families, following traditional child
rearing practices, were particularly vulnerable. According
to these reports, state welfare workers viewed these
families as backward, uncivilized, and unfit to raise
children.23 The reports also noted that some state welfare
22

By the 1970s, US removal policies had decimated Indian communities.
At least one-third of all American Indian children were being separated
from their families which was substantially higher than the removal
rates for non-Indian children. In Minnesota, Montana, South Dakota,
and Washington, the removal rates for Indian children compared with
non-Indian children was five to nineteen percent higher. In Wisconsin,
the rate of removal for Indian children was 1,600 times greater. See
Lorie M Graham, “The Past Never Vanishes: A Contextual Critique of
the Existing Indian Family Doctrine” (1998) 23:1 Am Ind L Rev 1 at
24. See also Elizabeth MacLachlan, “Tensions Underlying the Indian
Child Welfare Act: Tribal Jurisdiction over Traditional State Court
Family Law Matters” (2018) 2 BYUL Rev 455 at 456–57. They note
that “[t]he purpose of ICWA is to reverse the historic and recent effects
of removal of Indian children from their homes and tribal
communities.”

23

See US, Establishing Standards For The Placement Of Indian
Children In Foster Or Adoptive Homes, To Prevent The Breakup Of
Indian Families, And For Other Purposes (HR Rep No 95-1386)
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workers removed children simply because they were living
on an Indian reservation which, as one California case
worker put it, “is an unsuitable environment for a child.”24
These reports prompted Senator James Abourezk, one of
the main sponsors of the ICWA, to vigorously advocate for
the law’s passage.25 Abourezk believed that a national
Indian child welfare law was the only way to counteract the
harms caused by state welfare agencies “operat[ing] on the
(reprinted in 1978 USC CAN 7530, 7532) (documenting the
discriminatory practices of state and private adoption,welfare agencies,
and state court’s abuse of their power) [HR Rep]. See also Sarah
Krakoff, “They Were Here First: American Indian Tribes, Race, and
the Constitutional Minimum” (2017) 69:2 Stan L Rev 491 at 506.
Krakoff iterates that “Congressional reports documented the ignorance
and hostility of state social workers and judges toward tribal culture
and its benefits. . . . [S]tates asserted exclusive jurisdiction and denied
due process in state proceedings brought to remove Indian children
from their families”, quoting Nell Jessup Newton, Felix Cohen &
Robert Anderson, eds, Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law
§ 11.01[2] at 832 [Cohen’s Handbook].
24

Graham, supra note 22 at 27.

25

See Patrice H Kunesh, “Borders Beyond Borders - Protecting Essential
Tribal Relations Off Reservation Under the Indian Child Welfare Act”
(2007) 42 New Eng L Rev 15 at 41:
The Indian Child Welfare
Act
of
1977,
S. 1214, introduced on April 1, 1977 by Senator
James Abourezk (S.D.), Chairman of the Committee
on Interior and Insular Affairs, was co-sponsored by
Senators Hubert Humphrey (Minn.) and George
McGovern (S.D.), and referred to the Select
Committee
on
Indian
Affairs.
Senator Abourezk sponsored a similar bill, S. 3777, in
the 94th Congress, which was referred to the Senate
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and later
referred to the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs where
no action was taken.
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premise that most Indian children would really be better off
growing up non-Indians.”26
The ICWA vigorously rejects the idea that Indian
children are better off growing up away from their Indian
families and tribes. As the preamble states, the goal of the
Act is to:
protect the best interests of Indian children
and to promote the stability and security of
Indian tribes and families by the
establishment of minimum Federal standards
for the removal of Indian children from their
families and the placement of such children
in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect
the unique values of Indian culture.27
The Act seeks to achieve this goal of protecting
Indian families in a number of different ways but one of the
most important is by placing limitations on discretion of
state court judges presiding over cases involving Indian
children.28 It does this by recognizing and expanding the
authority of tribal courts over Indian child cases and by
requiring state courts to apply specific protections and
procedures when such cases are not removed to tribal court.

26

James Abourezk, quoted in Graham, supra note 22 at 25.

27

The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub L No 95-908, 92 Stat 3069
(codified as amended at 25 USC §§ 1901–1963).

28

See Paul David Kouri, “In re M.J.J., J.P.L., & J.P.G: The ‘Qualified
Expert Witness’ Requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act” (2005)
29:2 Am Indian L Rev 403 at 406.
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The Act protects tribal court authority and power
by recognizing tribes’ exclusive jurisdiction over child
custody determinations involving Indian children residing
or domiciled within an Indian reservation.29 It also requires
state courts to transfer jurisdiction to the tribal courts in any
proceeding for foster care placement or parental rights
terminations involving Indian children not domiciled
within the reservation.30 In addition, the Act guarantees
tribes or any “Indian custodian of the child” the right to
intervene “at any point” in any state court proceeding for
the foster care placement or termination of parental rights
of an Indian child31 and it requires states to give full faith
and credit to tribal court proceedings.32
For Indian child custody cases that are not
transferred to tribal court, the Act includes numerous
requirements that limit the discretion of state courts. For
example, the Act requires that state courts apply specific
placement preferences when determining the custody of
Indian children.33 In addition, the Act mandates that notice
is given to both the child’s parents and tribe of any pending
action,34 that “active efforts” are made to “provide
remedial services and rehabilitation programs” to help
29

See 25 USC § 1911(a).

30

See 25 USC § 1911(b). There are some exceptions to this transfer
provision. Specifically, the provision requires that neither parent
objects to the transfer and that there is an absence of good cause not to
transfer. The tribe may also decline to take jurisdiction in such cases.

31

25 USC § 1911(c).

32

See 25 USC § 1911(d).

33

See 25 USC § 1915(a).

34

See 25 USC § 1912(a).
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prevent breaking up the Indian family, and that any court
order placing an Indian child in foster care35 or terminating
the rights of an Indian child’s parents, is supported by
sufficient evidence including testimony of a qualified
expert witness.36
These ICWA protections, those recognizing and
protecting tribal court authority and those limiting state
court discretion, have been instrumental in helping combat
the legacy of the US’s Indian child removal policies.
C. AUSTRALIA’S INDIGENOUS CHILD
REMOVALS AND RESPONSE
The Indigenous child removals currently taking place in
Australia share many similarities with those occurring in
the US shortly before ICWA’s passage. At that time,
differences between Indian and non-Indian conceptions of
the family and “good” child rearing practices, were
routinely used to justify breaking up Indian families. In
Australia, such negative perceptions about Indigenous
families are common and similarly used to justify the
removal of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children.37

35

25 USC § 1912(d).

36

This must be demonstrated “by clear and convincing evidence” in the
case of foster care placement. See 25 USC § 1912(e). See also 25 USC
§ 1912(f) (“beyond reasonable doubt” in termination proceedings).

37

Although there seems to be an increasing willingness to recognize past
injustices towards Aboriginal people, the most recent reconciliation
barometer survey (a survey conducted every two years), revealed
troubling statistics about the levels of racial prejudice that Indigenous
people currently face. According to the survey “[o]ne in three
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Studies such as the Bringing Them Home Report38 note that
modern Indigenous child removals are frequently caused
by divergences between Indigenous and Western
conceptions of kinship and good child rearing practices.39
A highly public example of such divergence was recently
demonstrated on episode of the Sydney morning show,
Sunrise Sydney. In that episode, the program’s two hosts
advocated for expanding the adoption of Aboriginal
children by white families, because they believed it was the
best way to “save” them. The hosts recognized that their
suggestion sounded similar to the policies that created the
Stolen Generation. However, instead of being apologetic,
they embraced this comparison stating, “[j]ust like the first
Stolen Generation, where a lot of children were taken
because it was for their well-being, we need to do it

Indigenous respondents to the survey said they had endured verbal
racism in the past six months. Almost half (43 percent) of First Nations
people said they had been subjected to some form of racial prejudice
during the same period.” Ben Smee, “Truth Telling: 80% Say Past
Injustices Against Indigenous People Should Be Recognised”, The
Guardian (10 Feb 2019), online: <www.theguardian.com/australianews/2019/feb/11/truth-telling-80-say-past-injustices-againstindigenous-people-should-be-recognised>.
38

See Austl, Commonwealth, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
Commission, Bringing Them Home: Report of the National Inquiry
into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children
from their Families (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing
Service, 1997) [Bringing Them Home].

39

See ibid at 478–80, 486. They note that the Australian family law
system conflicts with Aboriginal child rearing values. See also John
Dewar, “Indigenous Children and Family Law” (1997) 19:2 Adel L
Rev 217 at 221. Dewar notes that Indigenous “conceptions of kinship
and good child-raising practice are significantly different from the
nuclear model.”
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again.”40 The hosts also scoffed at the idea that keeping
Indigenous children connected to their culture was
important. Instead, in a comment dripping with sarcasm,
they asked: “We need to be . . . putting them back into that
culture, what culture are they growing up seeing?”41
These types of biases regarding the benefits of
assimilation an a devaluing of Indigenous culture remain
common in Australia.42 As historian Tim Rowse has noted,
Australia’s history of and desire for assimilation is “built
into the very fabric Australian society . . . we cannot say
that it came to an end.”43 Professor Terri Libesman has
echoed this point, noting that in recent years, there has been
an increasing shift away from the recognition of “collective
histories and rights” to a greater focus on “mainstream
40

Emma Reynolds, “‘You Should Know Better, Sunrise’”, The Morning
Bulletin
(14
March
2018),
online:
<www.themorningbulletin.com.au/news/you-should-know-bettersunrise-breakfast-show-slam/3360362/>. Reynolds states that “Sunrise
is facing a backlash after a discussion on taking Aboriginal children
out of abusive family environments sparked accusations of ‘blatant
racism’ and ‘bottom feeding.’”

41

Ibid.

42

Other examples of such views in the popular press include shock jock
radio host Alan Jones’s claim on radio 2GB that “we need another
stolen generation.” See Graham Richardson, “Alan Jones Isn’t Racist,
He Wants Aboriginal Kids to Be Safe”, The Australian (19 February
2016), online: <www.theaustralian.com.au/commentary/opinion/alanjones-isnt-racist-he-wants-aboriginal-kids-to-be-safe/newsstory/9f1d66361ec70caa0c111f9eb9595c93>.

43

See Tim Rowse, “Introduction” in Tim Rowse & Richard Nile, eds,
Contesting Assimilation (Perth: API Network, 2005) 19, cited in Anna
Haebich, “Neoliberalism, Settler Colonialism and the History of
Indigenous Child Removal in Australia” (2015) 19:1 Aus Indig Rev 20
at 21.
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measures of well-being.”44 Professor Libesman believes
this has led to a “greater prevalence of populist racist
characterisations of neglect and abuse as pertaining to
cultural and individual Indigenous deficits.”45
Distressingly, these types of biases against
Indigenous families are even held by the organizations and
agencies tasked with helping them. In their work on
Indigenous child removals, Professors Kyllie Cripps and
Julian Laurens have demonstrated that bias against
Indigenous families and culture has led child welfare
agencies to devalue the importance of keeping Indigenous
children connected to their culture and communities and to
promote beliefs about Indigenous “dysfunctionality” in
order to justify government intervention.46

44

Haebich, supra note 43 at 28.

45

Ibid.

46

In this study, Kyllie Cripps and Julian Laurens argue that the child
welfare system’s bias towards permanency hurts Indigenous children
by preferring the mainstream child welfare goal of permanency over
connection to community. They suggest that the general neoliberalism
that currently defines Australia‘s child welfare policy is used to both
“justify intervention” into Indigenous people’s lives and that it relies
upon and promotes the narrative of Indigenous “dysfunctionality.”
Kyllie Cripps & Julian Laurens, “The Protection of Cultural Identity in
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children Exiting from Statutory
Out of Home Care via Permanent Care Orders: Further Observations
on the Risk of Cultural Disconnection to Inform a Policy and
Legislative Reform Framework” (2015) 19:1 Austl Indigenous L Rev
70 at 77. See also Jacynta Krakouer, Sarah Wise & Marie Connolly,
“‘We Live and Breathe Through Culture’: Conceptualising Cultural
Connection of Indigenous Australian Children in Out-of-Home Care”
(2018) 71:3 Australian Social Work 265 at 269. They found “that
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Scholar and social worker Doctor Steve Rogowski
has made similar observations. Rogowski notes that
organizations, like the Cape York Family Responsibility
Commission, offer support to Indigenous families, but
condition it on a willingness of the recipients to change
their lifestyles by joining the market economy and
becoming “responsible citizens.”47
It is difficult to prove that such biases are
responsible for the high rates of Indigenous child removals
in Australia. However, there is little question that
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children are removed
at disproportionately high rates when compared with their
non-Indigenous peers. These children made up
approximately 36 percent of all children living in out-ofhome care (OOHC) in 2015, a rate nearly ten times that of
other children.48 Moreover, as this disproportionate
representation continues to grow,49 it is becoming
Indigenous agencies and workers believed that family, community, and
cultural connection was a primary fundamental need for Indigenous
children in care, whereas non-Indigenous agencies and workers saw
cultural connection as just ‘one of many hierarchical needs.’”
47

Steve
Rogowski,
“From
Child
Welfare
to
Child
Protection/Safeguarding: A Critical Practitioner’s View of Changing
Conceptions, Policies and Practice” (2015) 27:2 Social Work in Action
97 at 97.

48

See Cripps & Laurens, supra note 46 at 70. The number of Indigenous
children removed and placed in OOHC now is higher than it was in
2008 at the time of the National Apology.

49

See Robyn Mildon & Melinda Polimeni, Parenting in the Early Years,
Effectiveness of Parenting Support Programs for Indigenous Families
(Canberra: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2012). See also
Cripps & Laurens, supra note 46 at 70 noting that “the rate of
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increasingly clear that the only significant nationwide
attempt to combat bias against Aboriginal families, the
Aboriginal Child Placement Principle (ACPP), is not
working.50
The ACPP is a set of guidelines first articulated by
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Care Agencies
concerning the care and custody of Indigenous children.51
Indigenous children entering OOHC was 9.5 times that for nonIndigenous children.”
50

See also Fiona Arney et al, Enhancing the Implementation of the
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Child Placement Principle:
Policy and Practice Considerations (Melbourne: Child Family
Community Australia, 2015). They note “the lack of adherence to the
Principle,” “that the best interests of children have not been considered
paramount in determining placements for Indigenous children,” and
“that cultural identity and connection have not always been a
consideration when making decisions about the best interests of
children.” See also Cripps & Laurens, supra note 46 at 76 describing
the “haphazard” application of the Placement Principles.

51

Austl, Commonwealth, Australian Institute of Family Studies,
Enhancing the Implementation of the Aboriginal Child Placement
Principle by Fiona Arney et al (Melbourne: AIFS, 2015), online:
<aifs.gov.au/cfca/publications/enhancing-implementation-aboriginaland-torres-strait-islander-child/export> (noting “[t]he Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Child Placement Principle grew from a
grassroots community movement initiated by Aboriginal and Islander
Child Care Agencies (AICCAs) during the 1970s”). The guidelines
were derived from the proceedings for the First Australian Conference
on Adoption which occurred in 1976. See Austl, Commonwealth,
Australian Law Reform Comission, Recognition of Aboriginal
Customary Laws? (Report No 31) (18 August 2010), online:
<www.alrc.gov.au/publication/recognition-of-aboriginal-customarylaws-alrc-report-31/16-aboriginal-customary-laws-aboriginal-childcustody-fostering-and-adoption/an-aboriginal-child-placementprinciple/>, s 352 (the section entitled “The Application of the
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The Principle states that “Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander children should be raised in their own
families and communities and if placed in out-of-home
care . . ., should be placed with Aboriginal or Torres Strait
Islander carers.”52 Each Australian state and territory has
enacted a version of the Principle into their adoption and
child welfare legislation. Unfortunately, compliance is
low. Studies indicate there is a 34 percent “non-compliance
rate” with the placement principle and that it is
increasing.53

‘Paramount Consideration’
Guidelines”).

to

Aboriginal

Children:

Policy

52

Claire Tilbury, “Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Child Placement
Principle: Aims and Core Elements” (June 2013) at 2, online (pdf):
Secretariat of National Aboriginal and Islander Child Care
<www.snaicc.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/03167.pdf>.

53

See also Calla Wahlquist, “Number of Indigenous Children in Care to
Triple Unless Spending Changes—Report”, The Guardian (28
November
2017),
online:
<www.theguardian.com/australianews/2017/nov/29/number-of-indigenous-children-in-care-to-tripleunless-spending-changes-report>, noting that as of 2016, only sixtyseven percent of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children
removed from their parents were placed with “family, kin, or an
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander carer.” In addition, the rate of
placement with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander carers (excluding
non-Indigenous family and kin) was only 50.5 percent. See also
Krakouer, Wise & Connolly, supra note 46 at 268–69, noting that “[i]n
Victoria, the Commission for Children and Young People . . . recently
found ‘a lack of evidence to demonstrate that Aboriginal children are
being placed at the highest level of the placement hierarchy’. The
Taskforce 1000 project, where the files of almost 1000 Indigenous
children in care in Victoria were audited, found that more than 60
percent of Indigenous children live in OOHC with non-Indigenous
carers.” See also Commission for Children and Young People, “In the
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As discussed above, in 2008, Prime Minister Kevin
Rudd apologized to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
people for the Stolen Generation and promised to take
action to protect Indigenous families. Notably, Rudd ended
the Apology by stating, “We take this first step . . . in
laying claim to a future where we embrace the possibility
of new solutions to enduring problems.”54 Sadly, in the
decade since Rudd’s apology, the Commonwealth has
offered no new solutions.55 Consequently, it is time to
reconsider the enactment of an Australian ICWA. In the
US, the Act has successfully helped combat unjustified

Child’s Best Interests: Inquiry into compliance with the intent of the
Aboriginal Child Placement Principle in Victoria” (2015), online (pdf):
<ccyp.vic.gov.au/assets/Publications-inquiries/In-the-childs-bestinterests-inquiry-report.pdf>. See also Austl, Commonwealth,
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Child Protection Australia
Report: 2014–15 (Child Welfare Series No 63) (Canberra: AIHW, 21
April 2016) at 54–55 (noting that 66 percent of Indigenous children
were placed in accordance with the ATSICPP).
54

Kate Grenville, “A True Apology to Aboriginal People Means Action
as Well”, The Guardian (14 February 2010), online:
<www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/feb/14/australiaaboriginals-apology-disadvantaged> (quoting Kevin Rudd).

55

See e.g. Austl, Senate, Community Affairs References Committee, Out
of
Home
Care
(19
August
2015),
online:
<www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Comm
unity_Affairs/Out_of_home_care/Report>,
discussing
the
overrepresentation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children
and making recommendations that have not been implemented. See
Dan Conifer, “Bringing them Home, Twenty Years After Report
Indigenous Children are Worse Off Than Before”, ABC News (25 May
2017) (noting “key recommendations from the national inquiry have
not been implemented and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
children now make up a larger part of the out-of-home care system”).
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Indian child removals.56 A similarly structured act could
have a comparable impact in Australia, but only if
Australia’s long-standing opposition to Indigenous selfdetermination begins to decline. Luckily, there are
indications this may be occurring.
II. CHILD WELFARE AND ABORIGINAL AND
TORRES ISLANDER SELF-DETERMINATION
As Part I of this article discussed, Indigenous advocates in
Australia have long sought an Australian version of the
ICWA57 and the recently proposed changes to Australia’s
56

See e.g. Sheri L Hazeltine, “Speedy Termination of Alaska Native
Parental Rights: The 1998 Changes to Alaska’s Child in Need of Aid
Statutes and Their Inherent Conflict with the Mandates of the Federal
Indian Child Welfare Act” (2002) 19:1 Alaska L Rev 57 at 59
(describing the ICWA as “one of the most important and far-reaching
pieces of legislation protecting Indian tribes”). See also Alex Tallchief
Skibine, “Indian Gaming and Cooperative Federalism” (2010) 42:1
Ariz St LJ 253 at 284 (describing the ICWA as “perhaps the most
important legislation enacted during this era”); Barbara Ann Atwood,
“Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare Act: Toward a New
Understanding of State Court Resistance” (2002) 51:2 Emory LJ 587
at 621 (noting that “[t]he ICWA has achieved considerable success in
stemming unwarranted removals by state officials of Indian children
from their families and communities”); Christine Basic, “An Overview
of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978” (2007) 16:1 J Contemp L Iss
345 at 349 (stating that “the Act is a success with regard to its goal of
giving Indian tribes more power over their members in general, over
their children in particular”); Graham, supra note 22 at 34 (stating that
“there is a general consensus among Native American nations and
organizations that the ICWA provides ‘vital protection to American
Indian children, families and tribes’”).

57

See e.g. supra note 7 presenting numerous requests for ICWA-type
legislation. See also Terri Libesman, Decolonising Indigenous Child
Welfare:Comparative Perspectives (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014) at
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federal adoption law have made the need for such
protective legislation more pressing than ever. Moreover,
although previous efforts to enact ICWA-type legislation
were unsuccessful, there is reason to believe future efforts
may enjoy greater success.
Previous attempts to enact ICWA-like legislation
were stymied by a lack of public and government support
for Indigenous self-determination.58 However, recent
Indigenous child welfare initiatives, such as those
implemented in Victoria and Queensland, appear to
indicate that despite the previously discussed biases, there
is also an increasing receptiveness for Aboriginal and
Torres Islander self-determination, particularly in the area
of child welfare.
A. SOVEREIGNTY, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBES,
AND THE ICWA
The purpose of the ICWA is to keep Indian children with
their families and communities or, failing this, with other
Indian families or communities. The Act achieves this goal
by ensuring the majority of Indian child welfare decisions
are made by the child’s tribe. Under the Act, the term
“tribe” refers to “any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other
organized group or community of Indians recognized as
eligible for the services provided to Indians by the
116 [Libesman, Decolonising Indigenous Child Welfare] (describing
how the ICWA has “served as an inspiration to Indigenous children’s
[welfare] groups internationally”).
58

See Briskman, supra note 7 at 119–21 describing the decades long
efforts by Indigenous advocacy groups to pass national Aboriginal
child welfare legislation.
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Secretary because of their status as Indians.”59 Such tribes
are recognized as possessing the inherent right to make
decisions concerning the care and welfare of their
members. Specifically, they are treated as quasisovereigns,60 which means they enjoy a special relationship
with the federal government and that they can pass laws
and have those laws enforced within their reservation.61
However, quasi-sovereignty also means that tribes do not
possess the full powers of sovereignty.62 Instead, they are
subject to the overriding control of the United States and
may not exercise any sovereign powers abrogated by
Congress in the exercise of its plenary power over Indian

59

25 US § 1903(8) (the definition of “Indian tribe”).

60

See Cherokee Nation v Georgia, 30 US (5 Pet) 1 (1831) [Cherokee
Nation]. The concept of limited sovereignty was first presented by
Chief Justice John Marshall in Cherokee Nation, in which he described
Indian tribes as “domestic dependent nations” at 2. See also United
States US v Kagama, 118 US 375 (1886) (noting that although tribes
are physically within the territory of the United States, they nonetheless
remain “a separate people, with the power of regulating their internal
and social relations” at at 381–82).

61

See e.g. Washington v Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima
Indian Nation, 439 US 463 (1979) at 500–01 [Washington v Yakima
Indian Nation], quoting Morton v Mancari, 417 US 535 (1974) at 551–
52 (“‘the unique legal status of Indian tribes under federal law’ permits
the Federal Government to enact legislation singling out tribal Indians,
legislation that might otherwise be constitutionally offensive”
(challenging Mancari’s application to the ICWA)).

62

See United States v Wheeler, 435 US 313 (1978) at 323 (describing
Indian tribes’ sovereignty as “unique and limited [in]
character. . . exist[ing] only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject
to complete defeasance”).

186

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 33, 2020]

affairs.63 Nevertheless, even within these limitations, the
sovereignty American Indian tribes continue to posses and
wield is significant.
As the US Supreme Court explained in Williams v
Lee, unless tribes have been divested of a particular right,
they retain the inherent “right [. . .] to make their own laws
and be ruled by them.”64 Moreover, although Congress
may divest tribes of various aspects of their sovereignty,65
states are prohibited from exercising powers that would
intrude on Indians’ right to sovereignty.66 These longaccepted ideas regarding Indian sovereignty were
incorporated into the ICWA. Specifically, the Act
recognizes that the care and control of Indian children is
one of the core areas of tribal sovereignty, that this right
63

See e.g. Oliphant v Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 US 191 (1978)
[Oliphant] (holding that tribes had been implicitly divested of criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians because the federal government did not
intend for non-Indian citizens to be adjudicated by tribal governments
under tribal laws that might treat such defendants unfairly or impair
their liberty interests).

64

Williams v Lee, 358 US 217 (1959) at 220 [Williams].

65

In fact, Congress has the ability to eliminate all sovereign rights of
Indian tribes. This power was clearly demonstrated through the policy
of termination which terminated the federal tribal relationship and left
the affected tribes on the same footing as any other group or
community of people in the United States. See generally Charles F
Wilkinson & Eric R Biggs, “The Evolution of the Termination Policy”
(1977) 5:1 Am Indian L Rev 139 at 151–54 (discussing the devastating
effects of termination legislation). See also Cohen’s Handbook, supra
note 23 at § 3.02[8][b] (discussing the effects of termination on the
tribal statuses of specific tribes).

66

Williams, supra note 64 at 220 (confirming that state action is
prohibited if it undermines “the right of reservation Indians to make
their own laws and be ruled by them”).
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has never been eliminated, and tribes may exercise this
right free from state or federal interference.67
B. INDIGENOUS SOVEREIGNTY IN AUSTRALIA
Australia does not have the United States’ history of
recognizing Indigenous sovereignty and the right of native
people to make and be governed by their own, separate
laws. In fact, such ideas actually conflict with the long-held
view that Indigenous people in Australia should not have
special rights.68 As Australian Professor Richard Chisholm
noted, in Australia, it is a commonly held view that “the
only future aboriginal people can, or should, have is as
ordinary members of the Australian community with
exactly the same legal rights and responsibilities.”69
67

The fact that Congress could eliminate this right does change the fact
that a recognition of tribal sovereignty is an essential aspect of how the
ICWA operates in the United States.

68

One arguable exception is native title property rights. See Mabo v
Queensland (No 2), [1992] HCA 23. See also Lisa Strelein,
Compromised Jurisprudence, Native Title Cases Since Mabo
(Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 2009) (discussing native title
cases since Mabo). See also Sean Brennan et al, eds, Native Title From
Mabo to Akiba: A Vehicle for Change and Empowerment? (Sydney:
Federation Press, 2015).

69

Richard Chisholm, “Towards an Aboriginal Child Placement
Principle: A View from New South Wales” in Bradford W Morse &
Gordon R Woodman, eds, Indigenous Law and the State (Dordrecht,
Holland: Foris, 1988) 315 at 318. Rob Riley posits that Indigenous
Australians are often treated as a minority with no rights or at best, only
those rights “that the majority group will allow, those rights that will
not interfere with the administration and development of the country in
the best interests of the majority.” See Rob Riley, “Aboriginal Law and
its Importance for Aboriginal People: Observations on the Task of the
Australian Law Reform Commission” in ibid 65 at 66.
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Consequently, Australia’s strong support of Indigenous
assimilation has long hampered efforts to pass national
Indigenous child welfare legislation.70 However, recently
enacted Indigenous child welfare programs in Victoria71
and Queensland72 demonstrate that opposition to
Indigenous control over child welfare is decreasing.73
For example, under the new Victorian program, the
guardianship of Aboriginal children has been transferred
from the state to the chief executive of an Aboriginal

70

Briskman, supra note 7 at 116 noting a reason “for the resistance is the
broader question of Aboriginal self-determination.”

71

See Calla Wahlquist, “Victoria Pledges Record Funds to Keep
Indigenous Children in Community Care”, The Guardian (26 April
2018),
online:
<www.theguardian.com/australianews/2018/apr/26/victoria-pledges-record-funds-to-keep-indigenouschildren-in-community-care> [Wahlquist, “Victoria Pledges”].

72

See Noel Niddrie & Kylie Brosnan, “Evaluation: Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Family Led Decision Making Trial” (October
2017),
online
(pdf):
<www.snaicc.org.au/wpcontent/uploads/2018/05/Evaluation_Report_ATSIFLDM-2018.pdf>.

73

These new programs do not give Indigenous communities decisionmaking power and thus, cannot be considered a sufficient substitute for
a national legislation akin to the ICWA. However, they do indicate
growing support for Aboriginal involvement in implementing the child
welfare policies that affect their children and communities. See
Libesman, Decolonising Indigenous Child Welfare, supra note 57 at
117 (noting that many of these programs were inspired by the Canadian
practice of delegating case management control to tribes; that led to the
development of memorandums of understanding between Australian
state child welfare departments and Australian Indigenous
Organizations).
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community-controlled organization (ACCO).74 Previously,
all children in care worked solely with the State
government through the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS). Under the new program, Aboriginal
child cases will now be handled by ACCOs and it is
expected that by 2021,75 100 percent of such cases will be
under the supervision of these organizations.76 Victoria’s
strong commitment to this plan is apparent in the progress
that has already occurred. In a March 2018 statement,
Victoria’s Minister for Families and Children, Jenny
74

Austl, Victoria, Transitioning Aboriginal Children to Aboriginal
Community-Controlled Organisations: Transition Guidelines
(Melbourne: Health and Human Services, October 2018), online
(word): <providers.dhhs.vic.gov.au/transitioning-aboriginal-childrenaboriginal-community-controlled-organisations-transition>
[Transitioning Aboriginal Children] (stating “[t]he Victorian
government is committed to self-determination and self-management
for Aboriginal people. This commitment includes enabling Aboriginal
children and young people subject to protection orders and placed in
the out-of-home care service system to be case managed, wherever
possible, by an ACCO” at 4). Under this change, Muriel Bamblett,
chief executive of the Victorian Aboriginal Child Care Agency,
became the legal guardian of dozens of Aboriginal children formly
under state guardianship. See Wahlquist, “Victoria Pledges”, supra
note 71.

75

The Aboriginal Children’s Forum (ACF) was established as a result of
an Aboriginal Children’s Summit convened by Minister Mikakos in
August 2015. The ACF is a representative forum of Aboriginal
Community-Controlled Organizations (ACCOs), the community
sector, and is government-convened quarterly. The forum was
established to drive the safety and well-being of Aboriginal children
and young people in or at risk of entering OOHC.

76

These recommendations were set by the ACF. See Transitioning
Aboriginal Children, supra note 74 at 4–5. See also Austl, Victoria,
“Aboriginal Children’s Forum” (26 June 2019), online:
<www.vic.gov.au/aboriginal-childrens-forum>.
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Mikakos, noted “the significant progress we have made in
transitioning Aboriginal children on protection orders to
Aboriginal organisations, . . . in fact we have reached a
milestone of a quarter of those children having
transitioned.”77
Like Victoria, Queensland has also made concerted
efforts to increase Aboriginal control over child welfare
cases. Recently, the state trialled a model of family-led
decision-making and then committed to its state-wide
implementation. According to Queensland’s action plan,
the state recognizes that in order to ensure all Indigenous
children in Queensland “grow up safe and cared for in
family, community and culture,” there is a “need to
‘change tracks’” and try a new way of protecting
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander families.78 As part of
this new approach, Queensland has promised to “share
power and responsibility with Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander leaders.”79 It has also agreed to “[i]nvest in
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communitycontrolled organisations [and] to implement Aboriginal

77

Jenny Mikakos, “Aboriginal Children’s Forum” (8 March 2018),
online: Jenny Mikakos: Member for Northern Metropolitan
<www.jennymikakos.com.au/parliament/aboriginal-childrensforum/>.

78

Austl, Queensland, “Changing Tracks: An Action Plan for Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Children and Families” (2017), online (pdf):
<www.communities.qld.gov.au/resources/campaign/supportingfamilies/changing-tracks.pdf> at 2.

79

Ibid at 20.
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and Torres Strait Islander family-led decision-making
across the state.80
The Victoria and Queensland programs are the
most significant state efforts to increase Indigenous control
over child welfare decisions. However, other states have
also made progress. For example, New South Wales
outlined its vision for greater Aboriginal control in its Plan
on a Page for Aboriginal Children and Young People
2015-202181 and through a set of Guiding Principles.82
The Plan on a Page seeks to create a strong safety
net of Aboriginal-controlled organizations that would meet
the needs of Aboriginal children and their families.83
Similarly, the Guiding Principles aim to foster
collaboration and cooperation between Family and
80

Ibid at 21.

81

See Aboriginal Child, Family and Community Care State Secretariat
(AbSec), “Delivering Better Outcomes for Aboriginal Children and
Families
in
NSW”
(May
2018),
online
(pdf):
<www.absec.org.au/~abab2882/images/downloads/NSW-ElectionPlatforms-AbSec-May-2018_final.pdf> at 4; AbSec, “Plan on a Page
for Aboriginal Children and Young People 2015-2021”, online (pdf):
<www.absec.org.au/images/downloads/Plan-for-AboriginalChildren-and-Young-People.pdf > [Plan on a Page]. It should also be
noted that although the NSW government has committed to this plan,
they have not yet provided funding.

82

See Grandmothers Against Removals (GMAR), “Guiding Principles
for Strengthening the Participation of Local Aboriginal Community in
Child Protection Decision Making” (Aug 2015), online (pdf): Family
&
Community
Services
<www.facs.nsw.gov.au/about/media/news/archive?a=373233>
[GMAR, “Guiding Principles”].

83

See Plan on a Page, supra note 81.
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Community Services (FACS) offices and Aboriginal
communities.84 This collaboration would then enable
Aboriginal communities to “participate with FACS in
decision making regarding the care and protection” of their
children.85 According to AbSec,86 both initiatives “[lay] a
strong foundation for . . . the development of an
Aboriginal-led service system to meet the needs of
Aboriginal children and families.”87
These initiatives indicate growing political and
popular support for Indigenous decision-making in the
child welfare context and suggest the likelihood of
increased receptivity to national Indigenous child
protection legislation. This change, combined with
Australia’s potential new adoption policies suggest that it
may be time for Indigenous advocates in Australia to renew
their efforts to enact ICWA-type legislation.88
Nevertheless, before beginning such advocacy, it is
84

See GMAR, “Guiding Principles”, supra note 82 at 3.

85

Ibid at 6.

86

The Aboriginal Child, Family and Community Care State Secretariat
(AbSec) is a not-for-profit incorporated community organization that
is recognised as the peak New South Wales Aboriginal Organization
providing child protection and out-of-home care policy advice on
issues affecting Aboriginal children, young people, families, and
carers.

87

AbSec, “Sector-Led Change Priorities for NSW”, online (pdf):
<www.absec.org.au/images/downloads/FamilyMattersNSW_Final_D
igital.pdf>.

88

See Libesmen, Decolonising Indigenous Child Welfare, supra note 57
(noting that “[l]eading Indigenous groups have called for national
legislation, inspired by the ICWA in the United States, to provide a
framework for the provision of child welfare services to Australian
Indigenous communities for many years” at 145).
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important to understand how an Australian ICWA would
differ from the American version and whether these
differences will impact the effectiveness, as well as the
desirability, of such legislation.
III. AN AUSTRALIAN ICWA
In the United States, tribes exercise decision-making
authority over Indian child welfare cases due to their
inherent sovereign authority. This authority is neither
delegated by the state or federal government nor is it
subject to state or federal oversight. Consequently, rather
than giving tribes rights, the Act protects rights tribes
already possess. In contrast, in Australia, Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander peoples do not enjoy recognized
sovereignty.89 As a result, the decision-making powers
necessary for an Australian ICWA to function would need
to be delegated by the Commonwealth.90 The first question,
89

They also do not have constitutionally protected rights of any kind,
unlike the Indigenous people in both Canada and the United States. See
e.g. Constitution Act, 1982, s 35, being Schedule B to the Canada Act
1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 (providing constitutional protections to the
Indigenous peoples of Canada). See also US Const art I, § 8, stating
“The Congress shall have Power. . . To regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
tribes.”

90

See Gaynor Macdonald, “Indigenous Treaties are Meaningless
Without Addressing the Issue of Sovereignty”, The Conversation (14
June 2018), online: <theconversation.com/indigenous-treaties-aremeaningless-without-addressing-the-issue-of-sovereignty-98006>
(discussing the problems with the proposed state treaties). While it
remains possible that Indigenous sovereignty could be recognized by
federal government, it is unlikely. Moreover, although some states and
territories, most notably Victoria and the Northern Territory, have
expressed willingness to enter into treaties with Aboriginal and Torres
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therefore, is whether the Commonwealth possesses the
authority to delegate such powers.
A. THE POWER TO CREATE ICWA
Since 1967, when s. 51 of the Australian Constitution was
amended,91 the federal government has had the power to
legislate with regard to Aboriginal and Torres strait
Islander people and, accordingly, to pass legislation akin to
the ICWA.92 In fact, in 1997, the New South Wales Law
Reform Commission specifically noted that the
Commonwealth had the power to enact such legislation
stating:
The Commonwealth Government arguably
already has the power to implement such
legislation under s 51(xxvi) of the
Constitution which gives the Commonwealth
“special powers” to legislate for Aboriginal
people.
The
Commonwealth
also
Strait Islander communities, as states and they do not actually possess
the sovereignty necessary to enter into treaties with sovereign nations.
91

See Constitution Alteration (Aboriginals) 1967 (Cth), 1967/55, s 2.

92

The amendment empowered the Commonwealth Government
(concurrently with the states) to enact “special laws” in respect to
Indigenous Australians. Before this amendment, the Commonwealth
could only enact such laws with regard to other racial groups. Section
51 does not require the Commonwealth to exercise these powers.
However, it is important to note that when the Commonwealth has used
this power, it has been to enact laws relating solely to Indigenous
Australians. See Shireen Morris, “Undemocratic, Uncertain and
Politically Unviable? An Analysis of and Response to Objections to a
Proposed Racial Non-Discrimination Clause as Part of Constitutional
Reforms for Indigenous Recognition” (2014) 40:2 Monash UL Rev
488 at 492.
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unquestionably has the power under s 51
(xxix) of the Constitution which allows the
Federal Government to legislate to bring into
effect treaties, such as the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child
(“UNCROC”), which Australia has ratified.
Australia is obliged under Article 4 of
UNCROC to undertake all legislative,
administrative and other measures for the
implementation of rights under UNCROC.93
Cases like Gerhardy v Brown,94 also suggest that a
law like the ICWA, which singles out Indigenous people for
special treatment, is permissible.95 As the court held in
93

Briskman, supra note 7 at 115.

94

See Gerhardy v Brown, [1985] HCA 11 [Gerhardy]. The court in
Gerhardy held that it is permissible to single out Aboriginal people for
special benevolent treatment without violating the Racial
Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), 1975/52 [RDA]. It should be noted that
this power is highly controversial in part due to the fact that the court
has held it permits race-based legislation that both advantages and
discriminates against Indigenous people. See generally Sarah
Pritchard, “The Race Power in Section 51 (XXVI) of the Constitution”
(2011) 15:2 Austl Indigenous L Rev 44.

95

See Gerhardy, supra note 94. Gerhardy is a case in which a defendant,
who was not a member of the Pitjantjatjara and thus had no right to
enter lands restored to Pitjantjatjara communities under the Anangu
Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara Land Rights Act 1981 (SA), 1981/20,
challenged his prosecution for illegal entry by arguing that the statute
limiting his access violated the RDA. The court disagreed, finding that
under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, 12 March 1966, 660 UNTS 195 (entered into
force 4 January 1969) [ICERD], this statute was excluded from the
category of racial discrimination. See also Morris, supra note 92 (“the
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Gerhardy, “[s]pecial measures taken for the sole purpose
of securing adequate advancement of certain racial or
ethnic groups or individuals . . . in order to ensure such
groups or individuals equal enjoyment of human rights and
fundamental freedoms” are excluded from the category of
racial discrimination.96
Furthermore, even if the courts were to conclude
the Commonwealth does not currently possess the
constitutional power to enact an ICWA, it would still be
possible for states to refer this power to the federal
government and have the Act passed pursuant to this
delegation. A similar cross-vesting scheme occurred with
regard to federal jurisdiction over ex-nuptial children.
Under s. 51 (xxi) of the Constitution, the Commonwealth
has law-making power over marriage and the children of
married couples, but not over de facto couples or their
children. This was problematic because the Family Court
could only deal with separations and custody disputes
between legally married couples. The court had no
jurisdiction over the de facto families. To solve this
problem, most of the states referred responsibility for these

High Court has indicated that the Race Power can probably be used for
beneficial or adverse use against particular races” at 492).
96

See ICERD, supra note 95. In fact, under the ICERD, such an exception
is required. See ibid, art 2 (“State Parties shall, when the circumstances
so warrant, take, in the social, economic, cultural and other fields,
special and concrete measures to ensure the adequate development and
protection of certain racial groups or individuals belonging to them, for
the purpose of guaranteeing them the full and equal enjoyment of
human rights and fundamental freedoms” at s 2).
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families to the Commonwealth.97 If needed, a similar
political solution could be used to provide federal
jurisdiction over Indigenous child welfare cases.
Given the above options, the enactment of national
Indigenous child welfare legislation should be legally
permissible. The thornier question is how a law written to
protect American Indian families would have to change to
work in Australia and whether these changes would defeat
the overall purpose of the Act.
B. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF INDIAN TRIBES AND
ABORIGINAL AND TORRES STRAIT ISLANDER
COMMUNITIES
The US Congress passed the ICWA to stop the widespread
termination of Indian parents’ rights and to reduce the
number of Indian children placed with non-Indian foster
and adoptive families. To achieve this goal, the Act
contains numerous protections against the unjustified
removal of Indian children. Many of these protections,
particularly the ones directed at state courts, appear fairly
easy to apply to Australian courts. For example, one of the
most important state court directed provisions is § 1915,
which contains the placement preferences and is very

97

All states except Western Australia have referred powers regarding de
facto couples. The reason Western Australia is an exception is that it
set up its own family court under state law. See Robert S French, “The
Referral of State Powers” (2003) 31:1 UWA L Rev 19.
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similar to the Aboriginal Child Placement Principle which
already applies to Indigenous child placements.98
Other provisions, such as the Act’s “active efforts”
requirement, which requires child welfare workers to take
additional steps to attempt to reunite Indian families after a
child has been removed,99 its notice requirements and its
heightened evidentiary standard should also be fairly easy
to adapt to the Australian legal system. None of these
provisions contain concepts foreign to Australian law or
are based on legal or judicial structures that do not exist in
Australia. Nevertheless, many other areas of the ICWA are
less easily imported. The three most difficult concern
reservation lands, tribal membership, and tribal
jurisdiction.
1. Reservations
Many of the ICWA’s provisions protect a tribe’s sovereign
right to make decisions concerning the care and welfare of
its members, particularly when those members reside
within the boundaries of the tribe’s reservation.100
Indigenous communities in Australia do not enjoy
98

By itself, the ACPP has had had only limited success. However, as part
of an Australian ICWA, it should have greater impact. See Part IV,
above, for a discussion on the creation of Indigenous tribunals to
implement the Act.

99

25 USC § 1912(d).

100

The US Supreme Court’s definition of “Indian reservation” is land
“validly set apart for the use of the Indians as such, under the
superintendence of the government.” United States v Pelican, 232 US
442 (1914) at 449. Under the ICWA, tribes have exclusive jurisidiction
to determine the care of custody of a child “who resides or is
domiciled” on a reservation. See 25 USC § 1911(a).
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recognized sovereignty or reservations of land over which
they may exercise sovereignty.101 This is potentially
problematic because reservation boundaries often
determine whether a tribal or state court has the authority
to determine the custody of an Indian child under the
ICWA. However, it is well-established that reservation
boundaries are not perfectly aligned with the boundaries of
tribal sovereignty.102 Moreover, this is particularly true
with regard to child custody cases. As an example, the US
Supreme Court held in Mississippi Band of Choctaw
Indians v. Holyfield, a tribe’s right to exert exclusive
jurisdiction over an Indian child-custody case is not limited
to instances where an Indian child is born or physically
101

See Leon Terrill, “Converting Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Land in Queensland into Ordinary Freehold” (2015) 37:4 Sydney L
Rev 519 at 521. Terrill explains that Indigenous people own 22.4
percent of the land in Australia, including approximately 45 percent of
the landmass in the Northern Territory. But, “[n]either statutory land
rights nor native title convey any form of jurisdictional authority, in
the way that reserve land in North America does.” Ibid at 533.
Indigenous ownership does come with certain additional rights,
however, these mostly relate to “control over exploration and mining
and additional protection from compulsory acquisition.” Ibid.

102

Tribal sovereignty may be limited within reservation boundaries. See
e.g. Montana v United States, 450 US 544 (1981) (holding that the tribe
lacked jurisdiction to regulate the hunting and fishing of non-Indians
within the reservation’s boundaries). See also Oliphant, supra note 63
at 212 (holding that tribes cannot criminally prosecute non-Indians
even for crimes committed within reservation boundaries). In addition,
some have suggested that tribal jurisdiction may extend beyond the
reservation boundaries, particularly with regard to tribal children. See
e.g. Patrice H Kunesh, “Borders beyond Borders - Protecting Essential
Tribal Relations off Reservation under the Indian Child Welfare Act”
(2007) 42:1 New Eng L Rev 15 at 53–57 (arguing that there should not
be any fixed boundaries delimiting tribal jurisdiction over Indian
children who are wards of the tribal court).
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residing on the reservation.103 The Holyfield Court
recognized that the ICWA was written to protect the rights
of tribes and tribal families and to do so, it must be able to
reach outside the reservation boundaries in certain
instances.104
The determinative factor when faced with questions
of the ICWA’s applicability is a child’s tribal citizenship or
eligibility for tribal citizenship, not their physical presence
on the reservation. Consequently, Australia’s lack of
defined Indigenous lands akin to Indian reservations
should not prove a significant impediment to the
importation of ICWA type legislation. However, the issue
of how to translate the provisions relying on tribal
membership may prove a bit trickier.
2. Membership
The ICWA only applies to Indian children, a term defined
as children who are enrolled members of an Indian tribe or
eligible for enrollment.105 As quasi-sovereign entities,
American Indian tribes have the inherent power to
103

See Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v Holyfield, 490 US 30
(1989) (finding that the Indian children were still “domiciled” on the
reservation despite the fact that their mother had left the reservation to
give birth) [Holyfield].

104

Specifically, the Court held that despite the fact the mother had
physically left the reservation to give birth, she and the children were
domiciliaries and thus the tribe had exclusive jurisdiction to determine
the adoption petition for her children. See ibid at 48.

105

See 25 USC § 1903(4) (defining Indian child to mean “any unmarried
person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an
Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is
the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe”).
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determine their membership free from federal or state
interference.106 As a result, nearly every federally
recognized tribe has established clear enrollment
criteria.107 They also typically compile detailed
membership rolls and have genealogy documents covering
more than a century.108 Consequently, the question of
whether a particular child is covered by the ICWA is
typically easy to determine.109 However, that is not to
106

See Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez, 436 US 49 (1978) [Martinez].

107

This membership criteria can vary widely from tribe to tribe. See
Rebecca Tsosie, “Indigenous Women and International Human Rights
Law: The Challenges of Colonialism, Cultural Survival, and SelfDetermination” (2010) 15:1 UCLA J Intl L & Foreign Aff 187 at 219–
20. Tsosie states that “[s]ome tribes require that the parents be
domiciled on the reservation at the time of the child’s birth. Some tribes
require lineal descendency from a male member, or alternately, from a
female member. This last requirement may reflect a traditional notion
of membership based on patrilineal or matrilineal descent.”

108

See Addie C Rolnick, “Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction Beyond
Citizenship and Blood” (2015) 39:2 Am Indian L Rev 337 (noting that
almost all tribes have “adopted formal enrollment criteria and
document enrollment via certificates or lists of members” at 380). See
also Jessica A Clarke, “Identity and Form” (2015) 103:4 Cal L Rev 747
(noting that “[m]any base rolls were determined by a federally
authorized census of tribal members, taken around the turn of the
twentieth century” at 803).

109

See e.g. Adoptive Couple v Baby Girl, 731 SE (2d) 550 (SC Sup Ct
2012) [Adoptive Couple]. In that case, there were difficulties
determining the child’s eligibility for membership, but this was due to
a misspelling of the father’s name and inaccurate birthdate in the
adoption attorney’s submission to the tribe rather than any unclear
membership criteria on the part of the tribe. Moreover, these
inaccuracies may have been intentional. See ibid at 554. Today, most
controversy surrounding membership tends to focus on challenges to
tribal enrollment criteria given that enrollment determines a host of
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suggest that tribal membership determinations in the
United States are without problems.
Tribal membership rolls grew out of lists compiled
by US government officials as a means to determine and
limit who would be entitled to tribal money and property.
The historic lists were often inaccurate and many excluded
large numbers of individuals, who should have been
designated as tribal members.110 In addition, there are
significant benefits. As a result, there have been many legal challenges
filed when tribes have changed enrollment criteria and thus
“disenrolled” some portion of their membership. See Joanne Barker,
Native Acts: Law, Recognition, and Cultural Authenticity (Durham,
NC: Duke University Press, 2011) (stating that “[s]pecific rights that
issue from [enrolled] membership include voting in tribal elections;
holding tribal office; sharing in tribal revenue; the use of tribal lands
and natural resources. . . and housing, health care, and education” at
82). See also Las Vegas Tribe of Paiute Indians v Phebus, 5 F Supp
(3d) 1221 (D Nev 2014) (involving a tribal member involuntarily
disenrolled as a result of an internal review of enrollment criteria);
Brackeen v Zinke, 338 F Supp (3d) 514 (ND Tex 2018) [Brackeen]
(sub nom Brackeen v Bernhardt), rev’d 937 F (3d) 406 (5th Cir 2019),
reh'g en banc granted 942 F (3d) 287 (5th Cir 2019). In that case, the
issue was not whether the child was eligible for tribal membership but
whether, regardless of membership, the Act was unconstitutional. See
ibid (“A.L.M. is an Indian child under the ICWA and the Final Rule
because he is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe—his biological
mother is an enrolled member of the Navajo Nation and his biological
father is an enrolled member of the Cherokee Nation” at 525).
110

See Rolnick, supra note 108 (“[i]t is difficult to tell whether tribes
would have adopted these descent requirements if the federal
government had not first refused to recognize anyone as Indian who
did not have a sufficient degree of Indian blood” at 431). The
controversy over the Cherokee Freeman also highlights this problem.
Many of the Freemen likely had Indian blood but we characterized
them as “black” based on the racist “one drop” policy of the time. See
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entire tribes that are historically, culturally, and genetically
“Indian”, yet, because these tribes did not have official
dealings with the US government during the colonial or
revolutionary period, they lack a recognized federal–tribal
relationship and, thus, are ineligible for the benefits of the
ICWA or most other federal Indian legislation.111

Cody McBride, “Placing a Limiting Principle on Federal Monetary
Influence of Tribes” (2015) 103:2 Cal L Rev 387 (“the rolls were
wildly inaccurate, and it is unclear how many people with Cherokee
blood were listed on the non-blood rolls simply due to their African
American appearance” at 405).
111

See Mark D Myers, “Federal Recognition of Indian Tribes in the
United States” (2001) 12:2 Stan L & Pol’y Rev 271 at 274:
There are many reasons a tribe might remain
unrecognized. In some cases, entire tribal groups were
never recognized due to their small size or the fact that
that they never had significant dealings with the U.S.
government. Many of these tribes never made war on
the U.S., or they reached agreements only with the
British crown or colonial governments. The AIPRC’s
final report to Congress identified a variety of
“historical accidents” that seem to explain why some
tribes have not been federally recognized…
The federal definition of “Indian” is complicated and while most
federal stautes require membership eligibility some do not. For
example, the Indian Health Care Improvement Act of 1976, 25 USC
§1601ff covers members of terminated and state-recognized tribes and
descendants of members of such tribes, in addition to members
of federally recognized tribes. See e.g. Margo S Brownell, “Who Is an
Indian? Searching for an Answer to the Question at the Core of Federal
Indian Law” (2001) 34:1 U Mich JL Reform 275 (describing the
nuances of federal laws based on different definitions of “Indian” at
282). See also Sharon O’Brien, “Tribes and Indians: With Whom Does
the United States Maintain a Relationship?” (1991) 66:5 Notre Dame
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Unlike the US government, Australia did not
compile detailed membership or census rolls.
Consequently, it could be difficult for Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander communities to create membership
criteria based on documented, historic descent. However,
this lack of record keeping may actually be a benefit.112 As
mentioned above, in the US, reliance on historic
membership lists has created a system in which tribal
membership is often determined in ways that can be
underinclusive and even unjust.113 More importantly,
although this historic connection to a federal–tribal
relationship has become a legal requirement for all federal

L Rev 1461 (discussing laws that apply based on blood quantum at
1484).
112

See notes 116–119 and accompanying body text, below, for a
discussion of the three-part aboriginality test.

113

A federally recognized tribe is one which has a government-togovernment relationship with the United States. However, there are
many Indian tribes that do not enjoy this relationship. Some of these
tribes have state recognition which entitles them to certain state rights,
but many have neither state nor federal recognition and, therefore, are
not entitled to any special rights. See e.g. Rebecca Tsosie, “Tribal Data
Governance and Informational Privacy: Constructing ‘Indigenous Data
Sovereignty’” (2019) 80 Mont L Rev 229 at 239 (noting “many
Indigenous groups are not protected by the federal trust responsibility,
such as state-recognized tribes that lack federal recognition and nonrecognized tribes that seek federal and/or state recognition. Indigenous
peoples who lack federal recognition also lack the ability to make laws
and apply them to a trust territory. They are also unlikely to have the
authority to protect the interests of tribal members to the extent that
these interests are separate and distinct from the interests of all citizens
(such as privacy) and assuming that the federal or state government is
unwilling to extend the rules that are applicable to federallyrecognized tribal governments.”)
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laws pertaining to Indian people in the United States, it is
otherwise irrelevant to goals of the ICWA.
The purpose of the ICWA is to protect modern day
connections between an Indian child and their family and
tribal community.114 Consequently, when considering the
application of ICWA-type legislation to Australian
Indigenous groups, documentary proof of a historic
connection to a particular ancestor should be unimportant.
What matters is that a modern day Aboriginal or Torres
Strait Islander community can demonstrate that the child or
their parent is a part of that community.
Consequently, the difficulty in translating the
applicability provisions of the ICWA to the Australian
context is not whether a particular Aboriginal or Torres
Strait Islander community can prove the child’s historic
connection to their community but rather, whether their
present-day membership determinations will be recognized
as legally valid.
For American Indian tribes, the right to set
membership criteria free from government interference and
114

Simply having an Indian ancestor is not enough for ICWA to apply.
ICWA requires a much more recent connection in the form of
membership or eligibility for membership of the Indian child which
typically means at least one parent is a member of a recognized Indian
tribe. See 25 USC § 1901. See also Kevin Noble Maillard, “The
Pocahontas Exception: The Exemption of American Indian Ancestry
from Racial Purity Law” (2007) 12:2 Mich J Race & L 351 at 381
describing the common occurrence of Americans who claim to have an
“‘Indian Princess Grandmother’ [which] does not assert a commonality
of interests with a pan-Native community. Rather, it announces a
connection to an ambiguity of indigenousness that is more historic than
personal.”
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control is well-established. It is recognized as part of the
inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes.115 In Australia, the
right to define Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
membership has been partially delegated to these
communities through the adoption of the three-part
definition which states “[a]n Aboriginal or Torres Strait
Islander is a person of Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander
descent who identifies as an Aboriginal or Torres Strait
Islander and is accepted as such by the community in which
he (she) lives.”116 Although this definiton gives some
control to Indigenous groups to define their membership,117
115

See Martinez, supra note 106 (finding the tribe had the ability to set
membership criteria based on otherwise unconstitutional gender
distinctions because membership determinations were a core aspect of
tribal sovereignty with which the federal government could not
interfere).

116

Austl, Commonwealth, Department of Aboriginal Affairs, Report on
a Review of the Administration of the Working Definition of
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders (Canberra, 1981), cited in
Austl, Commonwealth, The Definition of Aboriginality (Research
Note 18, 2000–01) by John Gardiner-Garden (5 December 2000) at
1. Interestingly, this is also the same test used to determine Métis
membership in Canada. See R v Powley, 2003 SCC 43.

117

See e.g. Gibbs v Capewell, [1995] FCA 1048 at para 21 [Gibbs]:
Aboriginal communal recognition will always be
important, when it exists, as indicating the
appropriateness of describing the person in question
as an “Aboriginal person”. Proof of communal
recognition as an Aboriginal may, given the
difficulties of proof of Aboriginal descent flowing
from, among other things, the lack of written family
records, be the best evidence available of proof of
Aboriginal descent. While it may not be necessary to
enable a person to claim the status of an “Aboriginal
person” for the purposes of the Act in a particular
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the interpretation of the three-part test and in particular, the
weight to be given to each of the three criteria typically
remains with the Commonwealth.118 Consequently, it is the
government and not the Aborignal or Torres Strait Islander
community that gets the ultimate say in membership
determinations.119
Having the government define Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander community membership for purposes
of an Australian ICWA is potentially problematic because
it would almost certainly limit the scope and protections
such an Act.120 Nevertheless, even if the government
case, such recognition may, if it exists, also provide
evidence confirmatory of the genuineness of that
person’s identification as an Aboriginal.
118

See e.g. ibid (the court stated “where a person has only a small degree
of Aboriginal descent, either genuine self-identification as Aboriginal
alone or Aboriginal communal recognition as such by itself may
suffice, according to the circumstances” at para 20).

119

The importance of Aboriginal membership designation recently gained
national attention in Love v Commonwealth of Australia; Thoms v
Commonwealth of Australia, [2020] HCA 3 in which two Aboriginal,
non-citizen men were ordered deported but challenged the Australian
government’s right to deport persons who were members of an
Aboriginal community. See Helen Davidson, “Citizenship Test: Court
to Decide whether Indigenous People can be Deported from Australia”,
The
Guardian
(3
December
2019),
online:
<www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/dec/04/citizenship-testcourt-to-decide-whether-indigenous-people-can-be-deported-fromaustralia>.

120

For example, the justices’ questioning during oral arguments at the US
Supreme Court for Adoptive Couple v Baby Girl demonstrated that
many had issues with the child’s designation as Cherokee and would
have limited eligibility for membership if possible. These justices
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dictated a less inclusive set of membership criteria than
Indigenous communities might desire, this would not
negate the overall benefits of an Australian ICWA. The Act
and its protections would still apply to all the children and
families that did meet this definition. The most important
question, then, is what court or courts will be applying to
these protections.
Many of the ICWA’s most critical protections
involve tribal courts and tribal decision-making, However,
Indigenous communities in Australia do not currently have
their own courts or the right to create such courts.121
asked many questions designed to highlight, question, or target the
Indian child’s blood quantum as a basis for disqualifying her from
eligibility for Cherokee Nation citizenship. For example, Chief Justice
Roberts inquired:
If—if you had a tribe, is there at all a threshold before
you can call, under the statute, a child an “Indian
child”? 3/256ths? And what if the tribe—what if you
had a tribe with a zero percent blood requirement?
They’re open for, you know, people who want to
apply, who think culturally they’re a Cherokee or—or
any number of fundamentally accepted conversions.
See Adoptive Couple v Baby Girl, 570 US 637 (2013) [Baby Girl] (Oral
argument at 38–39). The fear of “whites” claiming to be Indigenous
has been repeatedly been cited as a potential problem with the “threepart test” and a definition of aborigibality based on community
recognition. See e.g. Rhiannon Shine, “Claiming Aboriginality, Have
Tasmania’s Indigenous Services Been ‘Swamped with White People’”,
ABC News (30 June 2017), online: <www.abc.net.au/news/2017-0701/tasmanias-aboriginality-criteria-relaxation-affectingservices/8670254> (describing the controversy in Tasmania over
relaxing the proof of descent requirement).
121

In certain areas of Australia, courts have been created to be more
responsive to Indigenous needs. These courts are often composed of
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Therefore, in order for an Australian ICWA to be
successful, the creation of Indigenous tribunals may be
necessary.
IV. CREATING AUSTRALIAN ICWA COURTS
Arguably, the ICWA’s most important provisions are those
recognising exclusive tribal court jurisdiction over removal
and termination cases involving Indian children domiciled
on a reservation and concurrent jurisdiction with the state
courts over cases involving Indian children domiciled off
the reservation.122 These provisions rely on the existence
of tribal courts and this creates a problem for the Act’s
implementation in Australia where there are no Indigenous
tribunals similar to America’s tribal courts.
A. TRIBAL DECISION-MAKING
As quasi-sovereigns, Indian tribes have the right to create
their own laws and be governed by them. This means they
have the right to create independent courts that can apply
tribal law and operate free of most state or federal court

Indigenous decisions makers, but they still operate within the
Australian legal system and are created to apply Australian law, albeit
in a culturally sensitive way. See Lorana Bartels, “Indigenous-Specific
Court Initiatives to Support Indigenous Defendants, Vicitms and
Witnesses”, Indigenous Justice Clearinghouse (Brief No 17) (April
2015),
online:
<www.indigenousjustice.gov.au/wpcontent/uploads/mp/files/publications/files/rb17-indigenous-specificcourts-bartels-2015-ijc-webv2.v1.pdf>.
122

See 25 USC § 1911(a), (b) (regarding Indian tribe jurisdiction over
Indian child custody proceedings).
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review.123 In child custody cases, this separation from state
and federal control provides Indian families with strong
protections from non-Indian bias and helps ensure Indian
families are judged according to the norms and values of
their community. In addition, this separation also allows
tribal courts to operate outside a Western judicial model

123

The one exception is with regard to tribal court jurisdiction. Federal
courts may not review the merits of tribal court decisions. However,
they do have the right to review and potentially overturn tribal court
determinations regarding their own jurisdiction. Still, even
jurisdictional challenges must first be heard in tribal court and may
only be challenged in federal court after tribal court remedies have
been exhausted. See Iowa Mut Ins Co v LaPlante, 480 US 9 at 19
(1987) asserting that federal courts may not review the merits of tribal
court decisions: “Unless a federal court determines that the Tribal
Court lacked jurisdiction . . . proper deference to the tribal court
system precludes relitigating of issues raised by the [tribal members’]
bad-faith claim and resolved in the Tribal Courts.” The US Supreme
Court case, Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v Holyfield
challenged tribal court jurisdiction under ICWA. The challenge in
Holyfied was denied. See Holyfield, supra note 103. However, state
assertions of jurisdiction in ICWA cases may be challenged in federal
court and have often been overturned. Federal courts have held that a
state’s refusal to enforce ICWA creates a federal question that may be
heard in federal court. See Native Village of Venetie IRA Council v
Alaska, 944 F (2d) 548 (9th Cir 1991) holding that federal courts in the
9th Circuit can be used to enforce the provisions of ICWA. See also
United States v Lopez, 2012 WL 6629601 at 6 (DSD 2012) requiring a
non-Indian father seeking to challenge tribal court’s jurisdiction under
§ 1914 to first raise his claim in tribal court. See also BJ Jones, “The
Indian Child Welfare Act: In Search of a Federal Forum to Vindicate
the Rights of Indian Tribes and Children Against the Vagaries of State
Courts” (1997) 73:3 NDL Rev 395 (noting that “[a] party could also
challenge a state court’s decree not to transfer jurisdiction over a
proceeding to a tribal court based on the best interest of the Indian
child, as this is clearly covered by § 1911(b)” at 432).

ICWA DOWNUNDER

211

and make decisions in ways that reflect Indigenous values
and norms.
An Australian ICWA could include provisions
establishing Indigenous tribunals with the authority to
enforce the Act and make child custody determinations.
However, because the power to create such courts would
need to be delegated by the Commonwealth, these tribunals
could not have the independence of tribal courts. Instead,
they would remain subject to government oversight and
influence. In the past, similar forms of government
supervision have impeded attempts to increase Indigenous
self-determination in Australia. The history of the
Australian and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC
or the Commission) is particularly informative and may
demonstrate the steps needed to ensure that government
supervision of Indigenous decision-making under an
Australian ICWA does not become similarly detrimental.
B. LESSONS FROM THE ATSIC
The ATSIC was created in 1989 to provide Indigenous
people in Australia with a voice in the federal government,
particularly with respect to the issues affecting their
communities.124 From the start, one of the Commission’s
124

See Larissa Behrendt, “Representative Structures—Lessons Learned
from the ATSIC Era” (2009) 10 J Indigenous Pol’y J 35 at 36. Behrendt
noted that:
The objects and function, when read together,
established a framework of responsibilities that
conferred to ATSIC the primary role of advising the
Federal Government on any matters relating to
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and for

212

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 33, 2020]

weaknesses was that it operated within a Western political
and administrative model alien to Indigenous
family/clan/community structures. As one critic of the
ATSIC explained, “We are always expected to change to
fit into a [W]estern system and way of thinking. We have
to compromise our history and language and still the
government will refuse to listen to our needs. We are forced
into fitting into these models.”125 An Indigenous ICWA
court based on delegated powers would be susceptible to
similar criticisms. However, there were other, even more
substantial problems with the structure of the ATSIC, and
these difficulties also have significant implications for the
effectiveness of an Australian ICWA and the Indigenous
tribunals attempting to apply it.
1. Enforcement
The ATSIC was created to increase Aboriginal and Torres
Strait self-determination, but the Commission had no
independent power. This meant that its policy suggestions
could be dismissed or ignored because it did not have the
authority to ensure the cooperation of the Commonwealth,

the oversight of all government effort in policy
development and the provision of services to
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.
125

John Hannaford, Jackie Huggins & Bob Collins, Department of
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (Austl), In the
Hands of the Regions—A New ATSIC: Report of the Review of the
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (November 2003)
at
31,
online
(pdf):
<old.antarqld.org.au/pdf/ATSIC_review_report.pdf>.
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State, and Territory governments.126 The Commonwealth
could have delegated the Commission the authority that it
needed to ensure such cooperation, yet, it did not. This
omission was due, in large part, to the fact that the
relationship between the ATSIC and the Commonwealth
was highly fraught and stemmed from the Commission’s
dual role within the Commonwealth.
2. Dual Loyalties
Although the ATSIC included an elected branch, the
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs remained at the top of the
legislative structure with significant power over decisions
made by the elected representatives. This resulted in
tension between ATSIC’s responsibilities to the
Commonwealth and its duties to its Indigenous
constituents.127 This tension was especially pronounced
126

ATSIC did not have the power under s. 7 of the ATSIC Act to act in a
specific coordinating role or ensure the cooperation of the
Commonwealth, State, and Territory governments. See Tim Goodwin,
“A New Partnership Based on Justice and Equity: A Legislative
Structure for a National Indigenous Representative Body” (2009) 10 J
Indigenous Pol’y J 2 (noting that “the first independent review of
ATSIC broadly recommended that more power be shifted to regional
councils and that ATSIC be given greater ability to develop more
effective relationships with State and Territory governments through
multilateral agreements” at 5).

127

The combination of these roles created tension between its advocacy
and service delivery obligations. Specifically, ATSIC was to be
accountable to the federal government in its service delivery and
monitoring role while its elected arm was to be accountable to its
Indigenous constituency. See Angela Pratt, Department of
Parliamentary Services, Parliamentary Library, Social Policy Group,
Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs
(Austl), “Make or Break? A Background to the ATSIC Changes and
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when the ATSIC’s strategies and policies conflicted with
the federal government’s positions128 such as the
Commission’s focus on recognizing specific Aboriginal
rights, a goal significantly different from the
Commonwealth’s policy of “practical reconciliation.”129
The Commission wanted to increase Aboriginal
self-determination while the government was primarily
concerned with overcoming specific disadvantages facing
Indigenous people.130 Prime Minister John Howard (who
the ATSIC Review”, Current Issues Brief No 29 2002-03 (May 26,
2003),
online:
<www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Pa
rliamentary_Library/Publications_Archive/CIB/cib0203/03cib29>.
128

See Goodwin, supra note 126 (explaining that the ATSIC had a
mandate to formulate and implement programs for Indigenous
Australians and to develop policy proposals at all levels but lacked the
freedom to do this effectively at 22–23).

129

For a discussion of the government’s policy of “practical”
reconciliation, see Andrew Gunstone, “The Failure of the Howard
Government’s ‘Practical’ Reconciliation Policy”, in Hurriyet Babacan
& Narayan Gopalkrishnan, eds, The Complexities of Racism:
Proceedings of the Second International Conference on ‘Racisms in
the New World Order’ (University of the Sunshine Coast, 2008) 34.

130

See Behrendt, supra note 124 (noting “ATSIC’s position had always
been that the recognition and enjoyment of rights are required if any
real, meaningful and sustainable progress is to be attained” at 37). The
Commission also demonstrated its independence from the
Commonwealth in several specific ways. For example, it aligned itself
with regional land councils, rather than the Commonwealth, over
proposed amendments to the Native Title Act. It produced its own
report for the UN Committee of the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination that was independent of the government’s report, and
it continued to seek a treaty between Indigenous and non-Indigenous
Australians despite the Howard government’s rejection of this idea.
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was in office from 1996 to 2007) was one of the staunchest
supporters of “practical reconciliation.” Consequently, the
Commission was put in the untenable position of trying to
protect and expand Indigenous rights while also seeking
the approval of a government strongly opposed to such
rights.131 It was impossible.

See Will Sanders, “Towards an Indigenous Order of Australian
Government: Rethinking Self-Determination as Indigenous Affairs
Policy” (Discussion Paper originally delivered at the Rethinking
Indigenous Self-Determination conference at the University of
Queensland, Brisbane, 2001), Discussion Paper No 230, 2002, Centre
for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research (CAEPR), The Australian
National
University
at
7–8,
online
(pdf):
<caepr.cass.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/docs/2002_DP230_0.pdf>.
131

Even before assuming the role of Prime Minster, Howard resisted the
creation of the ATSIC, believing that it gave Indigenous peoples an
undesirable “separate” status. In a 1989 parliamentary debate, Howard
voiced these beliefs, stating:
I take the opportunity of saying again that if the
Government wants to divide Australian against
Australian, if it wants to create a black nation within
the Australian nation, it should go ahead with its
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission
(ATSIC) legislation. . . . The ATSIC legislation
strikes at the heart of the unity of the Australian
people. In the name of righting the wrongs done
against Aboriginal people, the legislation adopts the
misguided notion of believing that if one creates a
parliament within the Australian community for
Aboriginal people, one will solve and meet all of those
problems.
See Commonwealth, House of Representatives, Parliamentary
Debates (11 April 1989) at 1330, 1332 (Mr. John Howard, Bennelong,
Leader
of
the
Opposition),
online
(pdf):
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Due to its support for Indigenous selfdetermination, the Commission never received the active
backing of the Howard Government. This left it unable to
effectively represent its Indigenous constituents and,
ultimately, led to the Commission being declared a
failure.132 In 2004, the ATSIC was abolished, and its
functions were transferred to the governments of the
Commonwealth, states, and territories.
C. OVERCOMING THE WEAKNESS OF
DELEGATED POWERS
The history of the ATSIC demonstrates the limitations and
precariousness of delegated Indigenous rights. The ATSIC
was not given enough power to be effective; it lacked the
necessary independence from government control; and it
had little protection against its own dissolution.133
However, these problems were not inherent to the ATSIC.
Any Indigenous decision-making body relying on
delegated powers could face similar problems.

<parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/chamber/hansardr/1989-0411/toc_pdf/H%201989-04-11.pdf>.
132

ATSIC was tasked with fulfilling a number of different roles. It had
regional councils which were elected bodies that were to represent the
needs of their local communities and an administrative branch which
was supposed to monitor the effectiveness of other agencies and to help
develop programs and policies to help Aboriginal people. See
generally Behrendt, supra note 124 discussing the difficulties that the
ATSIC faced.

133

The commission was abolished in 2004, and this marked the end of
“representative structure at the national level chosen by Indigenous
people” and a return to handpicked appointments. See Behrendt, supra
note 124.
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Recognizing this problem, recent Indigenous advocacy has
focused on securing constitutional rights.
In 2017, over 250 Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander people met at Uluru to present the Australian
Parliament with the “Uluru Statement from the Heart”, a
proposal to establish a constitutionally enshrined First
Nations representative body that would provide a “Voice
to Parliament” by enabling Indigenous Australians to elect
representatives who would advise Parliament on policy
affecting Indigenous peoples.134
Unfortunately, the Commonwealth’s reaction to the
“statement from the heart” as well as continued calls for
“the Voice”, demonstrate that opposition to Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander separateness and sovereignty
remains significant.135 The Uluru Statement from the Heart
received wide-spread public support yet, the
Commonwealth government has, so far, refused to take
action. In October 2017, Prime Minster Turnbull stated that
the proposal was “neither desirable nor capable of winning
acceptance in a referendum.”136 Turnbull also described it
as inconsistent with democratic principles because only
Indigenous Australians would be able to be or elect
134

See Bridget Brennan, “Referendum Council Advises Government to
Hold Vote on Indigenous ‘Voice to Parliament’”, ABC News (16 July
2017),
online:
<www.abc.net.au/news/2017-07-17/referendumcouncil-advises-vote-on-indigenous-voice-parliament/8716242>.

135

See Part I discussing the long-standing Australian opposition to
separate rights for Indigenous people.

136

Calla Wahlquist, “Indigenous Voice Proposal ‘Not Desirable,’ Says
Turnbull”, The Guardian (26 October 2017), online:
<www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/oct/26/indigenousvoice-proposal-not-desirable-says-turnbull>.
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members of the representative body.137 When Prime
Minster Scott Morrison won the federal election, he
promised to end the Commonwealth’s opposition to the
Uluru proposal and to recognize Indigenous Australians in
the constitution. So far, this has not occurred. Despite his
promises of change, Morrison has rejected enshrining an
Indigenous “Voice to Parliament” in favor of more
“pragmatic models.”138
The failure of the ATSIC, and the Australian
government’s continuing opposition to Indigenous
separateness suggests that the creation of Indigenous
tribunals to implement an Australian ICWA would face
significant challenges. Still, these obstacles are not
insurmountable. An examination of the ATSIC’s failures,
as well as the current government’s opposition to
Aboriginal self-determination more generally, can be used
to craft an Australian ICWA with the best chance of
success.
1. Enforcement Power
The first major problem with the ATSIC was its lack of
enforcement power.139 If an Australian version of the
ICWA were to be successful, it would need to include a
137

See ibid.

138

Shahni Wellington, “Enshrined Voice to Parliament Ruled Out as a
Referendum Option”, National Indigenous Television (22 October
2019), online: <www.sbs.com.au/nitv/article/2019/10/22/enshrinedvoice-parliament-ruled-out-referendum-option>.

139

One of the major criticisms of the ATSIC was that its ministerial advice
“fell on deaf ears.” See Thalia Anthony, “Learning from ATSIC”, ABC
News (5 January 2010, last modified 28 September 2010), online:
<www.abc.net.au/news/2010-01-06/27934>.

ICWA DOWNUNDER

219

procedure for establishing Indigenous tribunals140 and a
method to ensure that they possessed the power to have
their decisions enforced. Such tribunals could not be part
of an independent judicial system like those existing on
many Indian reservations. However, if they were created
and housed within the current Australian court systems,
they could have the same judicial powers as any other
Australian court.141 In addition, as judicial rather than
administrative bodies, these proposed courts would have
independence from executive control and, thus, they could
avoid one of the major problems experienced by the
ATSIC.142

140

Although many American Indian tribes have complex court systems,
there are currently no Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander equivalents,
and these courts would need to be created. For example, although many
Australian jurisidctions have Indigenous sentencing courts, these are
not Indigenous controlled and they may not apply traditional or
customary law or forms of punishment. See Kathleen Daly & Elena
Marchetti, “Desistance and Indigenous Sentencing Courts”,
forthcoming in Northern Territory Law Journal, online:
<www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0023/234428/2017Daly-and-Marchetti-Desistance-and-indigenous-sentencing-courtspaper.pdf>.

141

These Indigenous decision-makers would be exercising judicial
functions as part of the judicial system and, thus, would not run afoul
of Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. See Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, [1995] HCA 10 (requiring strict separation
of judicial power from executive and legislative power).

142

See Michael E Black, “The Federal Court of Australia: The First 30
Years—A Survey on the Occasion of Two Anniversaries” (2007) 31
Melbourne U L Rev 1017 at 1022 stating “[t]he point is that there have
always been matters of special federal concern that the Parliament has
determined should remain within the exclusive jurisdiction of a federal
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These proposed Indigenous tribunals could be
established as a new branch of the Federal Circuit Court or
Family Court or, if the proposed merger of the Federal
Circuit Court and Family Court occurs, as a division of this
new Family Court system.143 Another option would be to
have these tribunals created by vesting judicial authority in
designated Indigenous decision-makers. In Spring 2017,
the Turnbull Government began trialing a program to have
certain family law disputes determined by psychologists,
social workers, or other non-lawyers.144 It is possible that
court, whether the High Court of Australia or a court created by the
Parliament under Chapter III.”
143

The merger was set to occur in early 2019, however, it is unclear if the
necessary support will materialize. See Michaela Whitborn, “Family
Court Dealt Fatal Blow Before Election”, The Sydney Morning Herald
(4 April 2019), online: <www.smh.com.au/national/family-courtmerger-plan-dealt-fatal-blow-before-election-20190404p51aoc.html>. See also Matthew Doran, “Sweeping Changes to
Family Court Announced as Broader Review of Strained System
Continues”,
ABC
News
(29
May
2018),
online:
<www.abc.net.au/news/2018-05-30/sweeping-changes-to-familycourt-as-broader-review-continues/9813434>. Adding additional
divisions to either of these court systems seems possible. Both the
federal circuit court and family court were already previously divided.
The federal circuit court was divided into the fair work and general
divisions. Similarly, the family court was broken up into two divisions,
the appellate and general divisions. See Catherine Caruana,
Department of Social Services (Austl), “Round-up of Developments in
Family Law”, Family Matters Issue No 83, Australian Instiute of
Family
Studies
(October
2009)
at
52,
online:
<aifs.gov.au/publications/family-matters/issue-83/family-lawupdate>.

144

“The pilot dispute-resolution project, which will involve parents
appearing before multi-disciplinary panels without legal
representation, is aimed at providing a quicker and less complex
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this program could serve as an example of how judicial
authority could be transferred to a panel of Indigenous
decisions-makers. A particular advantage of this type of
tribunal is that it would enable Indigenous decision-makers
to operate outside of a traditional Western judicial
setting.145
Ideally, the tribunals created to determine ICWA
cases would be community-specific. There would be one
tribunal for each Aboriginal or Torres Strait community
consisting of decision-makers from that community. This
would allow for community tailored decision-making, but
alternative to the courts and will have input from experts other than
lawyers.” It will also have limited rights of appeal. See Nicola
Berkovic, “Family Law Could Bypass Judges in Plan Being Trialled
by the Government”, The Australian (4 October 2017), online:
<www.theaustralian.com.au/business/legal-affairs/family-law-couldbypass-judges-in-plan-being-trialled-by-government/newsstory/03083e9e2fac809d841e0f59ac3967aa>. See also Nicola
Berkovic, “Psychologists ‘Better Placed than Judges’ to Decide Kids
Custody”, The Australian (24 February 2018), online:
<www.theaustralian.com.au/business/legal-affairs/psychologistsbetter-placed-than-judges-to-decide-kids-custody/newsstory/20b59114c6a31b9c16a4987c96523e7c> quoting Professor
Patrick stating: “The idea that a recently appointed judge with a
background in commercial law is better at deciding parenting cases
than a multidisciplinary panel consisting of a very experienced family
lawyer and psychologists, psychiatrists, or others with years of
experience in the field needs to be challenged.”
145

The panels are being promoted as a “fast, informal, non-adversarial
dispute resolution mechanism.” See Lydia Campbell, Department of
Parliamentary Services, Parliamentary Library, Research Branch
(Austl), Parenting Management Hearings, Budget Review 2017–18
(May
2017),
online:
<www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parlia
mentary_Library/pubs/rp/BudgetReview201718/ParentingHearing>.
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it would also require the creation of numerous new courts.
If the creation of so many new courts is not possible, an
alternative would be the establishment of a smaller number
of Indigenous courts, consisting of decision-makers from
multiple communities within a specific geographic area. In
the United States, a tribal court may only apply the law of
its particular tribe.146 Consequently, a court representing
multiple tribes is not possible in the US; but in Australia,
such a court would be possible. Australian Indigenous
courts would apply Australian law and, thus, could also
represent more than a single Indigenous community.
The benefit of creating Indigenous Australian
courts is not in the application of Indigenous law. Rather,
it is in the application of an Indigenous perspective and
understanding to Australian law by a tribunal possessing
the complete range of judicial powers.147

146

See generally John J Harte, “Validity of A State Court’s Exercise of
Concurrent Jurisdiction over Civil Actions Arising in Indian Country:
Application of the Indian Abstention Doctrine in State Court” (1997)
21
Am
Indian
L
Rev
63
at
66–67
noting
“[t]ribal court jurisdiction is limited through treaty provisions, federal
statutes, and, in certain areas, as a result of the dependent status of
Indian nations. Tribal court subject matter jurisdiction is also limited
to those areas that are necessary to the protection of tribal selfgovernment and continued control over internal relations.”

147

Specifically, the benefit of Indigenous child welfare courts is that they
are part of the Indigenous community and thus, able to approach child
welfare cases with a better understanding of the needs and experiences
of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children and families. See e.g.
Deirdre Howard-Wagner, “Child Wellbeing and Protection as a
Regulatory System in the Neoliberal Age: Forms of Aboriginal Agency
and Resistance Engaged to Confront the Challenges for Aboriginal
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2. Lack of Independence
The second problem identified by the ATSIC experience
was the organization’s lack of independence from
Commonwealth control.148 Indigenous tribunals created to
apply an Australian ICWA would be subject to similar
governmental control and oversight. These courts would
exercise delegated powers and, thus, their decisions would
be subject to review and potential reversal by a nonIndigenous court. Consequently, their decisions would lack
the finality of most US tribal court child placement
decisions, and this appellate oversight is a potential
weakness of these proposed tribunals. However, it may
also have some advantages.
Instead of undermining Indigenous decisionmaking, appellate oversight has the potential to create a
level of trust and cooperation between Indigenous and nonIndigenous decision-making bodies that is not possible
People and Community-Based Aboriginal Organisations” (2015) 19
Austl Indig L Rev 88 at 92, noting:
Aboriginal organisations are better placed to [help
Aboriginal families] based on their own experience,
including the fact that community-based Aboriginal
organisations are able to situate the Aboriginal child’s
well-being and care in a community-like setting,
creating a modified kinship environment, and using
cultural resources, to respond to the needs of the
Aboriginal child and young person.
148

See Anthony, supra note 139 suggesting that the success of any future
version of ATSIC must “be measured by its capacity to develop
independent and critical positions and the willingness of Governments
to engage with these positions.” See also Sanders, supra note 130 at 7–
8 discussing ATSIC’s struggles to maintain independence from
Commonwealth control.
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with the United States’ sovereignty-based tribal courts. In
the US, the ICWA treats state courts as hostile to tribal
interests and limits their power over Indian children
accordingly. Unfortunately, although this mandated
separation between tribal and state courts is intended to
protect tribal decision-making, it has also resulted in a
climate of distrust that can reduce the effectiveness of the
ICWA.
State courts often fear that tribal courts will not
make the “correct” child custody decisions, and this
concern can make them unwilling to cede jurisdiction to
the tribe. ICWA exceptions like “existing Indian family”149
and “best interest”150 stem from such concerns. These
exceptions assume that tribally chosen caregivers are less
desirable than those chosen by a state court and that tribal
assertions regarding the importance of cultural connections
are overblown or untrue. These exceptions demonstrate
that many state courts do not trust tribes to protect the best
interests of their own children, and this is extremely
problematic.
Australia’s Indigenous tribunals would be subject
to appellate review, but it is possible that this oversight
could foster a level of trust and understanding that has
never developed between tribal and state courts in the
United States. Specifically, due to the necessity of
149

See Atwood, supra note 56 at 625 describing the existing Indian
Family exception as being “used to deny transfer in cases in which the
court determines that despite the child qualifying as an ‘Indian child’
under the Act, the ICWA is inapplicable because the court determines
the child has not been removed from an ‘existing Indian family.’”

150

See Part V.B.2 of this article explaining the best-interests exception.
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appellate review, an Australian ICWA has the potential to
encourage communication and cooperation between the
Indigenous courts and non-Indigenous courts. It could
direct the appellate courts to view their role as nurturing
and supporting Indigenous decision-making rather than
policing it.
Lastly, as Part V will discuss in further detail, the
availability of appellate review could also help reduce the
public’s distrust of Indigenous decision-making and thus
avoid a problem that has proven a significant obstacle to
ICWA’s acceptance in the United States.
3. Dissolution
The third problem that the ATSIC faced was its
vulnerability to dissolution. Every unpopular decision or
recommendation that the Commission made threatened its
future and the potential repucussions of offending the
Commonwealth prevented the ATSIC from effectively
representing Indigenous interests.151 The proposed ICWA
tribunals could suffer the same flaw unless they are
151

In the end, it was the Comission’s challenges to the federal government
that led to its dissolution. See e.g. Virginia Falk, “The Rise and Fall of
ATSIC: A Personal Opinion” (2004) 8:4 Australian Indigenous L Rep
17 at 17–19 (arguing that the decision “to abolish ATSIC [was] based
on the fundamental idea that a dissident voice is better silenced. ATSIC
consistently and audibly challenged the Federal Government over a
number of major Aboriginal issues, including the Amendments of the
Native Title Act 1998, and apology to the Stolen Generations, the
introduction of mandatory sentencing laws and the formation of a
Treaty between Aboriginal nation groups and the Federal Government.
Its failure to follow the ‘black bureaucracy script’ made ATSIC a prime
target for dismantling”). See also supra note 133 (discussing the
dissolution of ATSIC).
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afforded a comparable level of stability as that enjoyed by
other Australian courts.
Specifically, these tribunals must be afforded the
ability to issue unpopular decisions without fear of
dissolution or other retribution. Their decisions may be
reversed by an appellate court but only if reversal can be
legally justified. Any proposed Indigenous child protection
legislation should, as much as possible, include assurances
that Indigenous decision-making will be protected against
government retaliation and withdrawal of support. These
decision-makers need the freedom to issue potentially
controversial decisions without worrying that such
decisions will result in a diminishment of their power.
V. THE BENEFITS OF A DELEGATED ICWA
For reasons previously discussed in Part II Section D, an
ICWA based on recognized sovereignty provides more
robust and comprehensive protections than one based on
delegated power. Nevertheless, if the above
recommendations and safeguards are implemented, the
benefits of a delegated ICWA remain significant. Such
legislation would increase Indigenous control over child
welfare decisions, reduce the unjustified breakup of
Indigenous families, and keep Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander children connected to their communities and
culture. In addition, a delegated ICWA has the added
benefit of achieving these results in a way that is potentially
less controversial than the United States’ sovereigntybased approach.
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A. ABORIGINAL CONTROL
In the United States, the ICWA reduces the unjustified
removal of Indian children and seeks to keep these children
connected to their tribes and culture. The Act does this by
increasing tribal court control over Indian child welfare
cases and by limiting state discretion in the cases that
remain in state court. The Australian Indigenous tribunals
proposed in this article would not possess the exclusive
jurisdiction exercised by American tribal courts, and no
Indigenous child welfare decisions could be insulated from
non-Indigenous
review
and
potential
reversal.
Nevertheless, creating Indigenous tribunals to serve as the
initial decision-makers in Indigenous child welfare cases
would be a big step towards increasing Indigenous control
over these decisions.
In other contexts, increasing Indigenous control
over family protection and welfare decisions has been
shown to be highly beneficial. For example, the AbSec
report, Aboriginal Parenting Programs: Review of Case
Studies, noted the particular effectiveness of “Aboriginalled practice in the provision of parenting supports.”152
According to the report, using Aboriginal service providers
“strengthened community trust in the service and
supported the engagement and ongoing participation of
Aboriginal families.”153 Similarly, prenatal and infant care
152

See Aboriginal Child, Family and Community Care State Secretariat
(AbSec), Aboriginal Parenting Programs: Review of Case Studies
(January
2018)
at
4,
online
(pdf):
<absec.org.au/~abab2882/images/downloads/AbSec-AboriginalParenting-Support-Report-Final-January-2018.pdf>.

153

Ibid at 27.
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provided by Aboriginal organizations has also been shown
to significantly improve outcomes for pregnant Indigenous
women and their children.154 Consequently, it is likely that
comparable benefits of increased trust and engagement
would attach to child welfare determinations made by
Indigenous decision-makers pursuant to an Australian
ICWA.
In addition, giving initial control over child welfare
decisions to Indigenous tribunals should also help reduce
the racial biases and cultural misunderstandings that have
so often affected these types of cases. Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander decision-makers will be more
familiar with the cultural practices of their communities
than their non-Indigenous counterparts, and this should
enable them to better evaluate the effects of child-rearing
practices and beliefs that differ from Western norms.
Moreover, although the decisions of these Indigenous
tribunals could be reversed on appeal, it is likely that such
reversals will become less frequent as the non-Indigenous
courts become more familiar and comfortable with
Indigenous decision-making.
B. CONTROVERSY AND OPPOSITION
In the US, tribes and their advocates are strong supporters
of the ICWA. Nonetheless, the Act is controversial, and
opposition appears to be growing. In fact, there is the real
possibility that this opposition may soon result in
significant limitations on the ICWA’s protections and
154

See Esther Han, “Tailored Care for Pregnant Indigenous Women
Improves Outcomes”, The Sydney Morning Herald (2 June 2018),
online: <www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/tailored-care-for-pregnantindigenous-women-improving-outcomes-20180531-p4zikx.html>.
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possibly even its repeal. Three recent developments
demonstrate the growing divide between the ICWA’s
supporters and its critics. The first is the Supreme Court
case, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl;155 the second is the
reactions to the codification of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs’s (BIA) ICWA guidelines, and the third is the recent
federal district court case, Brackeen v. Zinke.156 These
three events all demonstrate the vulnerability of the ICWA
in face of mounting criticisms that the Act harms Indian
children instead of helping them.
1. Baby Girl
Baby Girl involved a custody battle between a Cherokee
birth father and a non-Indian adoptive couple. Immediately
after Baby Girl’s birth, her mother placed her for adoption
with the adoptive couple, the Cappobiancos, who named
her Veronica. Veronica’s birth mother did not inform the
father of the adoption but when he found out, he objected
and immediately challenged it as a violation of the ICWA.
Specifically, the provisions limiting a state court’s ability
to terminate an Indian parent’s custody rights and
mandating that Indian children are placed with Indian
caregivers before non-Indian families may be considered.
Neither of these protections were applied to Baby Girl’s
adoption and, thus, the case appeared to be a clear violation
155

See Baby Girl, supra note 120.

156

See Brackeen, supra note 109. Brackeen was subsequently reversed by
a panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, and is now before the
Fifth Circuit en banc. See Brackeen v Bernhardt, 937 F (3d) 406 (5th
Cir 2019); Brackeen v Bernhardt, 942 F (3d) 287 (5th Cir 2019).
Regardless of the ultimate outcome of this case, it is clear that the
ICWA and the rights it protects are vulnerable to attack.
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of the ICWA. Nevertheless, when the case reached the
Supreme Court, the father lost.
Baby Girl was first heard by a South Carolina state
family court which held that Veronica’s adoption violated
the ICWA and that she must be returned to her father’s
custody. This decision was then affirmed by the South
Carolina Court of Appeals and the South Carolina Supreme
Court. Under the language of the ICWA, the decision to
return Veronica to her father appeared legally correct yet,
it created immense opposition. There were protests and
rallies, national television appearances by the adoptive
couple, and, eventually, an appeal to the US Supreme
Court. The rallying cry of the protesters was, “Save
Veronica.”157 These protesters believed it was in
Veronica’s best interest to remain with the adoptive couple.
Consequently, they concluded that if the ICWA mandated
her removal, then the Act was harmful to her and any other
children like her.
When the Baby Girl case reached the Supreme
Court, numerous advocacy organizations submitted amicus
157

See “Save Veronica”, online: <www.saveveronica.org/> (last visited
July 8, 2019). See also Allyson Bird, “Broken Home: The Save
Veronica Story”, Charleston City Paper (26 Sept 2012), online:
<www.charlestoncitypaper.com/
charleston/broken-home/Content?oid=4185523>; “Veronica May Not
Be
Saved”,
ABC
News
(26
July
2012),
online:
<www.abcnews4.com/story/19121303/veronica-may-not-be-saved>;
“Local Repair Shop Joins Fight to ‘Save Veronica’”, ABC News (6 Jan
2012), online: <www.abcnews4.com/story/16465999/emily-workingon-this>; Haley Hernandez, “‘Save Veronica’ Effort Holds Candlelight
Event in Charleston”, Count on 2 News (28 Jan 2012), online:
<www2.counton2.com/news/2012/jan/28/3/save-veronica-efforthold-candlelight-event-charle-ar-3131169/>.
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(friend-of-the-court) briefs, in which they attacked the Act
as a dangerous, race-based law that harmed Indian children
and should be abolished. These arguments appear to have
influenced the Court’s decision.158 As Professor Bethany
Berger notes in her article, In the Name of the Child:
Most striking in [Baby Girl] was the role of
race. Before the U.S. Supreme Court, the
[adoptive couple’s] attorneys . . . argued that
ICWA was unconstitutional, race-based
legislation. . . . In the first line of the
decision, the Court stated that “[t]his case is
about a little girl (Baby Girl) who is classified
as an Indian because she is 1.2% (3/256)
Cherokee.” . . . [T]he statement was untrue
on several levels and irrelevant to the legal
issues in the case, but it was consistent with
an effort that has existed since colonial times
to erase Native peoples and their sovereignty
by facilitating the assimilation and absorption
of Native individuals.159
Although the Court did not specifically hold the Act
was racially impermissible, it appears that the Court was
highly sympathetic to these concerns.

158

However, the specific holding of the case was a convoluted and weakly
supported interpretation of the Act’s “continued custody” provision
which the Court held did not apply to the birth father since he was never
married to the birth mother and thus Baby Girl was never removed
from his custody. See Baby Girl, supra note 120 at 641.

159

Bethany R Berger, “In the Name of the Child: Race, Gender, and
Economics in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl” (2015) 67 Fla L Rev 295
at 297–98.
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The Baby Girl decision was a blow to the ICWA and
its supporters, but the actual holding of the case was
relatively narrow. It only applied to the relatively small set
of ICWA cases in which an Indian child is placed for
adoption without ever having been within the “custody” of
the objecting Indian parent.160 However, more recent
challenges to the Act pose much greater threats and
demonstrate that the concerns articulated in the Baby Girl
case, that ICWA harms Indian children, are still growing.
2. ICWA Exceptions and the Bureau of Indian Affairs
Response
Baby Girl was the first time the US Supreme Court
appeared highly receptive to the argument that the ICWA
harms Indian children. However, there is a long history of
state courts embracing these concerns and crafting
exceptions to the Act as a result. Some of these exceptions,
like the “existing Indian family exception” have largely
disappeared.161 Unfortunately, others, such as the “best
interests” exception, remain widespread.
160

Ibid at 313–14.

161

See In re AJS, 204 P (3d) 543 at 544 (Kan Sup Ct 2009) (overturning
the exception and the case that originally created it). However, some
scholars have argued that Baby Girl revived this exception. See e.g.
Shawn L Murphy, “The Supreme Court’s Revitalization of the Dying
‘Existing Indian Family’ Exception” (2014) 46:3 McGeorge L Rev 629
at 647. See also Marcia A Zug, “The Real Impact of Adoptive Couple
v. Baby Girl: The Existing Indian Family Doctrine Is Not Affirmed,
but the Future of the ICWA’s Placement Preferences Is Jeopardized”
(2014) 42:2 Cap U L Rev 327 (arguing Baby Girl did not affirm the
EIF doctrine instead, “the Court found there was no Indian family
because the father had no legal or physical relationship with his
daughter, but not because he was not Indian enough” at 342).
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The “best interests” exception is the state court
response to the ICWA’s preference for tribal court decisionmaking162 and its limitations on state court discretion.
Courts use this exception when they wish to avoid
transferring an Indian child custody case to a tribal court.
The implication behind this exception is that tribal courts
are less likely than state courts to make custody
determinations that protect the best interest of the child.163
State courts cannot overturn tribal court custody
determinations and state welfare workers cannot enter a
reservation to “check-up” on tribal children. Consequently,
courts use the “best interest” exception as a way to get
around the ICWA’s jurisdictional limitations and retain
control over Indian child custody cases.
162

See Atwood, supra note 56 at 657–58 discussing the “perceived
conflict between the goals of promoting tribal survival and the child’s
interest in becoming or remaining a member of the tribal community,
on the one hand, and that same child’s pressing interest in continuity
of care.” See also Holyfield, supra note 103 at 50 (recognizing the
possibility of a conflict between the desires of the tribe and those of
individual tribal members).

163

Despite the presumption of transfer in § 1911(b), the Act states that
courts may refuse transfer upon a finding of “good cause” and courts
have interpreted “good cause” to include their own ideas regarding
what best interests means. See Matter of Adoption of FH, 851 P (2d)
1361 at 1363–64 (Alaska Sup Ct 1993) holding that the best interests
of the child supports good cause to decline to follow ICWA placement
preferences. See also In the Matter of MEM, 635 P (2d) 1313 (Mont
Sup Ct 1981) finding best interests constituted good cause; State of
Arizona v Moya, 667 P (2d) 234 (Ariz Ct App 1983) holding best
interests of the child constitutes good cause; In the Matter of Maricopa
County Juvenile Action No JS-8287, 828 P (2d) 1245 at 1251 (Ariz Ct
App 1991) finding best interests applicable in determining good cause;
In the Matter of NL, 754 P (2d) 863 at 869 (Okla Sup Ct 1988) finding
child’s best interests supported good cause denial of transfer.
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Not surprisingly, Indian child welfare advocates
have long objected to the “best interests” exception and its
assumption that tribal courts do not protect Indian children.
As Professor Jeanne Carriere has written, “The notion that
Native American tribal courts are more likely than state
courts to neglect or inflict suffering on Native American
children is grounded in suspicion, not in objective
evidence.”164 Professor Carriere is correct, nevertheless,
this perception remains widespread.
Recently the BIA attempted to address these
negative perceptions about tribal courts by eliminating the
“best interest exception” and other ICWA workarounds
through a set of binding regulations. According to the BIA,
the inconsistent application of the ICWA165 was frustrating

164

Jeanne Louise Carriere, “Representing the Native American: Culture,
Jurisdiction, and the Indian Child Welfare Act” (1994) 79:3 Iowa L
Rev 585 at 629. It should be noted that this objection is not limited to
ICWA cases. It is common for non-Indians to object to tribal court
jurisdiction based on a perceived fear of tribal justice systems as
inherently unfair. See Marcia Zug, “Traditional Problems: How Tribal
Same-Sex Marriage Bans Threaten Tribal Sovereignty” (2017) 43:4
Mitchell Hamline L Rev 761 at 793 discussing how fear of tribal justice
influences objections to tribal court jurisdiction.

165

See MacLachlan, supra note 22 (noting “the most important response
to the inconsistent state court application of ICWA [are the] . . . new
ICWA guidelines and revised rules” at 458).
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Congress’s intent.166 The regulations167 were intended to
address the historic points of contention surrounding the
ICWA and, thus, increase compliance with the Act.168 In
2016, the regulations were enacted, but they have done
little to stem the controversy surrounding the ICWA. In
fact, the new regulations may have inflamed it. Now, state
courts have fewer options to avoid applying the ICWA in
individual cases and perhaps that is why attacks against the
Act as a whole are gaining traction.
3. Brackeen v. Zinke
Increasingly, critics of the ICWA claim the entire Act needs
to be revised or even eliminated. They argue that the Act
impermissibly determines custody based on racial and
cultural criteria with little regard for whether such
placements benefit individual Indian children.169 Shortly
166

See Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings Final Rule, 81 Fed Reg
38778 (2016) (codified at 25 CFR § 23) at 38782. It reads “[f]or
decades, various State courts and agencies have interpreted the Act in
different, and sometimes conflicting, ways. This has resulted in
different standards being applied to ICWA adjudications across the
United States, contrary to Congress’s intent.”

167

25 CFR § 23 (2016).

168

See Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings Final Rule, supra note 166.
Some of these changes include clarifications for transfers to tribal
courts, the establishment of pre-trial procedures for ICWA cases, and
defining key terms such as “active efforts,” “custody,” “Indian child,”
and “parent.”

169

See Suzette Brewer, “Indian Country Braces for Battle with Adoption
Industry over ICWA Guidelines”, Donaldson Adoption Institute (30
March 2015), online: <www.adoptioninstitute.org/news/indiancountry-braces-for-battle-with-adoption-industry-over-icwaguidelines/>. This article discusses opposition to the guidelines.
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after the Baby Girl case was decided, these arguments
began to appear in numerous suits challenging the ICWA
as unconstitutional racial discrimination.170 Initially, these
lawsuits all failed.171 However, in October 2018, in
Brackeen v. Zinke,172 a Texas district court accepted these
arguments and found the ICWA unconstitutional. Brackeen
was reversed by a panel of the Fifth Circuit and is now
pending before the Fifth Circuit, en banc, yet regardless of
how the case is ultimately decided, Brackeen marks a
turning point in ICWA litigation. It was the first time a
federal court declared the entire act unconstitutional.
Brackeen involved a non-Indian foster family
seeking to adopt an Indian child in violation of the ICWA.
According to the potential adoptive family, the Act was an
unconstitutional, race-based statute not narrowly tailored
enough to achieve Congress’s stated interests without
breaching the equal protection clause. Shockingly, the
170

The most concerted effort was the Goldwater class action which
alleged that that the application of the Act to Indian children violated
their equal protection rights. In March 2017, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari in this case, but other challenges have been filed in South
Carolina, Virginia, Oklahoma, and Minnesota. See Suzette Brewer,
“ICWA: Goldwater Case Thrown Out of Federal Court”, Indian
Country
Today
(21
March
2017),
online:
<newsmaven.io/indiancountrytoday/archive/icwa-goldwater-casethrown-out-of-federal-court-_RAMRUiYHUiSp1ffZ4JROQ>.

171

See AD v Washburn, No CV-15-01259-PHX-NVM, 2016 WL
5464582 at 4–5 (D Ariz 2016) (arguing ICWA and the BIA guidelines
are unconstitutional). See also “Challenging the Constitutionality of
ICWA: AD v Washburn”, Goldwater Institute (7 July 2015), online:
<goldwaterinstitute.org/en/work/topics/constitutional-rights/equalprotection/case/equal-protection-for-indian-children/>
[Goldwater
Institute].
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Brackeen, supra note 109.
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Brackeen court agreed. It concluded that the ICWA treats
Indian and non-Indian families substantially differently,
that the treatment Indian children receive is harmful and
that this different treatment renders the Act
unconstitutional. Specifically, the court explained the
ICWA harms Indian children by requiring “courts and
agencies to apply the mandated placement preferences,
regardless of the child’s best interest.” Like other recent
ICWA challenges, the assumption underlying the Brackeen
decision is that ICWA allows the child welfare system to
treat Indian children differently and worse,173 than nonIndian children.174

173

In Baby Girl, supra note 119, Justice Alito expressed similar concerns.
He worried the Act might “dissuade some . . . from seeking to adopt
Indian children,” which would “unnecessarily place vulnerable Indian
children at a unique disadvantage in finding a permanent and loving
home . . . .” See Baby Girl, supra note 119 at 653–54. Justice Alito’s
statement implies that the ICWA leaves Indian children vulnerable to
the whims of the Indian parent and acts to delay their search for a stable
home. See also Allison Krause Elder, “‘Indian’ as a Political
Classification: Reading the Tribe Back into the Indian Child Welfare
Act” (2018) 13:4 NW JL & Soc Pol’y 417 at 433 (discussing Alito’s
concerns that the ICWA harms Indian children). Similarly, Timothy
Sandefur, president of the Goldwater Institute refers to this as “the
ICWA penalty box,” meaning the ways Indian children are harmed or
“penalized for being Indian.” See Goldwater Institute, supra note 171.
See also Homer H Clarke Jr, “Children and the Constitution” (1992) 1
U Ill L Rev 1 at 29 arguing that the placement preferences and “other
provisions of the Act effectively give tribal political interests priority
over the interests of Indian children where adoption is concerned.”

174

The Brackeen decision demonstrates this belief by taking pains to
emphasize the legal difference between how placements are required
to occur under ICWA versus how they would proceed under respective
state law. For example, in addition to objecting to the mandated
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Brackeen was overturned by a three judge panel of
the Fifth Circuit and is now before the Firth Circuit en
banc. It is likely that the reversal will be upheld. However,
such a “win,” will not stop the attacks on the ICWA. In
fact, even if the Brackeen reversal is affirmed by the US
Supreme Court, ICWA challenges will likely continue and
provide new opportunities for the Act to be gutted or even
eliminated.175 Consequently, although the protection of
tribal court independence is an important benefit of the Act,
it is one that also makes the ICWA’s future uncertain.
Under an Australian ICWA, Indigenous child
custody decisions would occur within the current
Australian judicial system. As a result, the controversy
surrounding which court, state or tribal, best protects
Indigenous children’s interests could be avoided. Under an
Australian ICWA, non-Indigenous courts would retain
appellate oversight of Indigenous decisions. If such a court
believed an Indigenous tribunal issued a harmful or
incorrect custody decision, they could reverse it.
Consequently, this possibility of review and reversal
preferences under ICWA, that according to the Brackeen court do not
apply to non-Indian children under state law, the court also noted other
differences such as if and when parties may intervene in a child custody
proceeding, the length of time before voluntary relinquishment is
permissible, and the length of time a final adoption decree may be
subject to challenge. See Brackeen, supra note 109 at 529.
175

The influence of the Brackeen decision is already being felt. Shortly
after the case was decided, another Texas court placed a second Indian
child (the sister of the child in the Brackeen case) with the Brackeens
despite the fact she had Indian relatives ready and willing to take
custody of her. See Jan Hoffman, “Who Can Adopt a Native American
Child? A Texas Couple vs. 573 Tribes”, The New York Times (5 June
2019),
online:
<www.nytimes.com/2019/06/05/health/navajochildren-custody-fight.html>.
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should enable a potential Australian ICWA to avoid the
most contentious aspects of the US ICWA.176
C. ADDITIONAL BENEFITS OF APPELLATE
REVIEW
By reviewing Indigenous child welfare decisions,
Australia’s appellate courts would gain repeated exposure
to Indigenous decision-making. Hopefully, over time, this
familiarity with indigenous decisions will lead to a level of
judicial and public trust in these decisions that has not
materialized in the United States.
In the US, contact between state and tribal courts is
rare, and this has contributed to distrust between the two
decision-making bodies. Many of the most controversial
ICWA cases are those in which non-Indigenous courts and
litigants presume an Indian tribunal will decide a case in a
manner contrary to what a state court would decide, that is,
contrary to the child’s “best interest”. As discussed
previously, loopholes like the “best interest exception”
were created because of these fears. However, not only do
such exceptions undermine the ICWA, they also deny tribal
courts the opportunity to demonstrate the falsity of these
assumptions.
The US Supreme Court’s only other ICWA case,
Mississippi Band of Choctaw v. Holyfield, highlights how
a distrust of tribes and tribal courts can undermine the

176

See e.g. Vance v Boyd Mississippi, Inc, 923 F Supp 905 (SD Miss
1996) refusing to apply the tribal court exhaustion doctrine and taking
jurisdiction due to the fear it would be unable to review the tribal
court’s findings.
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ICWA and harm Indian children.177 The 1989 Holyfield
case concerned the adoption of twin Indian children born
off the reservation to an enrolled and domiciled member of
the Choctaw tribe. The issue in the case was which tribunal,
state or tribal, had the right to determine custody of the
twins. Much of the opposition to tribal court jurisdiction
was based on the assumption that the tribe would deny the
non-Indian couple the right to adopt the twins and place the
children, both of whom had special needs, in separate
Indian foster homes and with less qualified caregivers.178
The Supreme Court decided in favor of the tribe.179
However, after winning the case, the Choctaw court
surprised many ICWA critics by granting custody of the
children to the adoptive family.180 The Holyfield case
demonstrated how fears regarding tribal decision-making
are often unfounded. The Holyfield tribal court, like the
state court, concluded it was in the best interests of the
children to remain with the Holyfields. If the state court
had been more familiar with the Choctaw court, and more
willing to trust it, it is possible that the long, traumatic fight
over the Holyfield twins could have been avoided.

177

See Holyfield, supra note 103.

178

Solangel Maldonado, “Race, Culture, and Adoption: Lessons from
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v Holyfield” (2008) 17:1 Colum
J Gender & L 1 at 10–11 noting these concerns.

179

The Court held that ICWA confers exclusive jurisdiction over the
custody of children domiciled on the reservation and found that the
children’s birth outside the reservation did not change their domicile
which was based on the fact that their mother primarily resided on the
reservation.

180

See Maldonado, supra note 178 at 17.

ICWA DOWNUNDER

241

Under an Australian ICWA, Indigenous tribunals
would be located within the current Australian judicial
system and, thus, Indigenous and non-Indigenous tribunals
could have the opportunity to build the kind of trust that
was lacking in Holyfield. Consequently, an Australia ICWA
could both protect Indigenous children and families while
also avoiding the distrust and suspicion that has hampered
the Act’s success in the US. As a result, it is possible an
Australian ICWA could enjoy a significantly higher rate of
compliance than its US counterpart.181
D. THE ROLE OF CUSTOM AND TRADITION
An Australian ICWA would enable Indigenous decisionmakers to use their understanding of Indigenous traditions
and customs to determine custody placements that meet the
best interests of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
children. For example, such understanding of Indigenous
culture and practices could help a decisionmaker determine
181

Lack of compliance with ICWA is high in the US and not limited to
courts. See also Zug, supra note 164 at 796:
As recently as 2015, South Dakota was held to have
violated ICWA by disproportionately removing Indian
children from their families and placing them in white
homes. In one particularly telling example, South
Dakota Judge Jeff Davis was found to have removed
Indian children from their families one hundred
percent of the time. Matthew Newman, an attorney at
the Native American Rights Fund, stated, “We’re
often finding states inventing any reason under the
sun . . . not to place [the] child with [his or her]
family.”
See Tanya Asim Cooper, “Racial Bias in American Foster Care: The
National Debate” (2013) 97:2 Marq L Rev 215 at 245 discussing lack
of compliance with the ICWA.
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whether leaving a child with an extended family member
constituted abandonment or good parenting. However,
unlike tribal court judges, Indigenous decision-makers in
Australia would not be permitted to apply a different set of
laws to the custody cases they decided. Like all other
Australian courts, their decisions would be based on
applicable Australian law. This is a significant difference
from US tribal courts. However, there may benefits to this
limitation.
As explained previously, tribal sovereignty means
tribes have the right to make their own laws and be
governed by them. These laws can differ significantly from
the otherwise applicable state law and federal law and this
difference is often used to oppose tribal decision-making.
A clear example of this tendency to use tribal difference to
attack tribal jurisdiction was demonstrated in the recent US
Supreme Court case, Dollar General Corp v. Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indians.182
1. Dollar General Corp v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw
Indians
Dollar General involved a sexual assault against a minor.
The alleged assault was perpetrated by a non-Indian
employee of a Dollar General store located in Indian
country. The child and his family brought a civil suit
against Dollar General in tribal court.183 The company
182

136 S Ct 2159 (2016) [Dollar General].

183

Under US law, only the federal government can prosecute non-Indians
for crimes committed in Indian country. In Dollar General, as in the
majority of Indian sexual assault cases, the federal government
declined to prosecute.
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objected to tribal court jurisdiction because they believed
it was unfair to subject them to tribal law, rather than
“actual law,” by which they meant state or federal law.184
In its briefs, Dollar General emphasised that traditional
tribal methods of dispute resolution “differed substantially
from state and federal legal systems” and it bemoaned the
fact that these methods “require [tribal] courts to apply
tribal law, custom, and traditions.”185
Dollar General’s repeatedly referenced strange and
unfair tribal customs were used as a distraction to elicit
undeserved sympathy from the Court. In its amicus brief
supporting the Tribe, the federal government exposed this
ploy stating, “Here, in particular, there is no suggestion that
proving a breach of duty to refrain from sexual molestation
would require resort to ‘unique customs, languages, and
usages’ of the Tribe.”186 As the government pointed out,
prohibiting child molestation is not some “strange” Indian
custom; it is a core tenet of American criminal law.
Dollar General’s arguments regarding the dangers
of tribal tradition and custom in the context of a child
molestation case should have appeared absurd.
Consequently, the fact they did not is telling. As the case
demonstrated, non-Indian mistrust of tribal customs and
184

Garrett Epps, “Who Can Tribal Courts Try?”, The Atlantic (7 Dec
2015), online: <www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/whocan-tribal-courts-try/419037/>.

185

In fact, the words “tradition” and “custom”—or their derivatives—are
mentioned eighteen times in the brief. See Dollar General (Brief for
the Petitioners).

186

See Dollar General (Brief for the United States as amicus curiae
supporting Respondents) at 22.
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traditions is so great, the company believed it overcame an
otherwise compelling desire to protect children from
sexual predators.
2. ICWA and Tribal Custom and Traditions
In recent years, fear of tribal customs and traditions has
also been mobilized to attack the ICWA. Critics of the
ICWA routinely argue the Act is unconstitutional because
it permits the application of a different set of laws to Indian
child custody cases.187 These attacks intensified during the
Baby Girl case and are growing stronger. As the recent
Brackeen case demonstrates, the ICWA is under a very real
threat, but it is one that an Australian ICWA might be able
to avoid.
The Australian Indigenous tribunals proposed in
this article would be limited to applying Australian law.
However, this may not be as significant a weakness as it
first appears. Indigenous customs and traditions could still
inform the decision-makers’ understanding of these laws
but, because the law being applied is Australian, the use of
custom or tradition is unlikely to create the kind of ICWA
opposition that has materialized in the US.

187

These attacks ignore the long-standing legal precedent permitting
finding that the application of different laws for members of
recognized Indian tribes are constitutional. See Morton v Mancari, 417
US 535 at 547 (1974) finding an Indian employment preference
constitutional because it was based on political rather than racial
distinctions.
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CONCLUSION
As this article has argued, the lack of recognized
Indigenous sovereignty makes a potential Australian ICWA
less powerful than the US version. Nevertheless, such an
act would still increase protections for Indigenous children
and their families and could also provide certain
advantages over the US ICWA. Still, there is one final
difference between a sovereignty based and delegated
version of the ICWA that should be considered before
advocating for the passage of an Australian ICWA. This
difference concerns the cost of failure.
A. THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
INTERVENTION
The perceived failure of an Australian ICWA could have
significant implications for future efforts to increase
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander self-determination. In
fact, if the implementation of an Australian ICWA followed
the pattern of the ATSIC and the resulting Northern
Territory Intervention, the effects of its perceived failure
could be catastrophic.
The ATSIC was Australia’s first significant attempt
to increase Indigenous self-determination and the fact it
was a deemed a failure had wide-reaching and long-lasting
implications. After the Commission was disbanded, the
federal government’s belief regarding the importance of
consulting with Indigenous people about programs and
policies affecting their lives declined exponentially.188 At
188

See Jon Altman, “Neo-Paternalism: Reflections on the Northern
Territory Intervention” (2013) 14 J Indig Pol’y 31 at 33 discussing how
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the same time, the ideology of assimilation gained
momentum. Consequently, when the Little Children Are
Sacred report was released two years after the end of the
ATSIC (a report documenting the widespread sexual abuse
of Aboriginal children), the government decided to put
these new assimilationist ideas into action. The result
become known as The Northern Territory Intervention.
The abuse documented in The Little Children Are
Sacred report was already well known.189 However, the
report finally convinced the government to act on this
knowledge. Unfortunately, rather than working with
Indigenous communities to address the problem, the
government unilaterally decided to enact extreme
measures.190
The Northern Territory Intervention involved
military mobilisation and a set of power moves granting the
government direct control of the targeted communities for

the growing ideology of assimilation was used to justify abandoning
the principle of consultation with Aboriginal communities on the issue
affecting them.
189

See e.g. Melissa Sweet, “Australian Efforts to Tackle Abuse of
Aboriginal Children Without Consultation Raise Alarm” (2007) 335
Brit Med J 691 noting that there had been over twenty years of studies
documenting this abuse.

190

The Northern Territory National Emergency Response Act was
“supposedly drafted and enacted in only 10 days—without
consultation with aboriginal communities.” See Eddie Cubillo, “The
Nine Most Terrifying Words in the English Language Are: ‘I’m from the
Government and I’m Here to Help’” (2011) 13:1 Flinders LJ 137 at 145.
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a period of five years.191 These measures were instituted
without consulting the communities they would affect.192
Prime Minister Howard justified the government’s actions
as “exceptional measures to deal with an exceptionally
tragic situation”193 and he insisted that the old policy of
Indigenous consultation should be discarded in favor of
unilateral intervention. In fact, Howard specifically cited
ATSIC when arguing that Indigenous decision-making and
self-determination had been tried and failed194 and that
intervention and assimilation was the only remaining

191

See Rebecca Stringer, “A Nightmare of the Neocolonial Kind: Politics
of Suffering in Howard’s Northern Territory Intervention” (2007) 6:2
Borderlands E-Journal.

192

Remarking on this lack of consultation, Aboriginal activist Eduard
Cubillo stated, “we members of the First Nations were expected to
defer to the wisdom of the colonisers.” See Cubillo, supra note 190 at
148.

193

John Howard, “To Stabilise and Protect: Little Children Are Sacred”
(2007) 19:3 Sydney Papers 68.

194

Cubillo, supra note 190 at 143 noting the damage done to Indigenous selfdetermination and engagement by the abolition of ASTIC and then the
Northern Territory Intervention. See also Stringer, supra note 191 stating
the Intervention policy was “[o]penly adopting the politics of
assimilation and the de-realisation of Aboriginality it entails . . . to
transform ‘failed societies’” in which there is “no natural social order
of production” into “normal suburbs”. See also John Altman, “The
Howard Government’s Northern Territory Intervention: Are NeoPaternalism and Indigenous Development Compatible?” (Center for
Aboriginal Policy Research, Topical Issue No 16, 2007) arguing the
abolition of ATSIC helped pave the way for Intervention through an
increased emphasis on “Normalisation” for Indigenous Australians.
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options for protecting
communities.195

Indigenous

people

and

B. SLIPPERY SLOPE
The goal of an Australian ICWA would be to increase
Indigenous control over child welfare decisions. However,
if such a law were enacted and then perceived as failing to
protect Indigenous children and families, there is the
danger it could actually lead to greater government
intervention and less Indigenous control. In the absence of
recognized sovereignty, there is no presumption that
Indigenous communities in Australia possess the inherent
right to make decisions concerning the welfare of their
members. As a result, when these groups receive decisionmaking rights, as they did through the ATSIC, this
delegation of power can become a test of Indigenous
competence and worthiness to make decisions concerning
their lives and families. If these communities are perceived
as failing this test, there is the real possibility this failure
will be used to justify even greater government
intervention.
Australia’s experience with ATSIC and the
Northern Territory Intervention shows how laws and
policies intended to increase Indigenous self-determination
can sometimes create the opposite result. If the enactment
of an Australian ICWA is seen as encouraging controversial
or unjust child welfare decisions, or if it simply doesn’t
produce significant enough improvements, this “failure”
195

Cubillo, supra note 190 at 148. See also Haebich, supra note 43 noting
that these allegations were used “to rationalis[e] for mainstream Australians
the invasive actions of the Northern Territory interventions.”
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could be used to attack Indigenous decision-making in
general and justify even more invasive assimilation efforts.
Therefore, it is possible, that by passing legislation similar
to the ICWA, Indigenous communities in Australia could
actually wind up worse off than they were before such
legislation was enacted. This is a real concern but
ultimately, it may be a risk worth taking.
Current methods of protecting Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander families are not working. Indigenous
children continue to be removed at unacceptably high rates
and new solutions must be found. The limited examples of
Indigenous control over child welfare suggest this is the
most promising solution for protecting Indigenous
families. Therefore, Australia should consider enacting its
own version of the ICWA.
An Australian ICWA could not offer the same level
of protection as the American version of the Act, but it
could still reduce family separations and increase
Indigenous welfare. In addition, an Australian version of
the Act might even offer certain advantages over its US
counterpart. Nevertheless, the history of ATSIC and the
Northern Territory Intervention demonstrate that the
enactment of an Australian ICWA is not without risk.
Consequently, it is up to the Indigenous communities in
Australia (and their advocates) to determine whether the
possible downsides of pursuing such legislation are worth
the potential rewards.

